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ABSTRACT 
Parental Time and Children’s Obesity Measures: 
A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation. (December 2005) 
Wen You, B.A., Nankai University, P.R. China 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. George C. Davis 
                       Dr. Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. 
The increased prevalence of childhood obesity is a major concern for society. This 
study aims at exploring the influence of the parents (especially parental time allocation 
choices) on children’s obesity-related health outcomes and examining the potential 
differences between the fathers’ and the mothers’ marginal effects. 
A household with two parents and one child is modeled. The household production 
theory and the collective household modeling structure are combined. The model treats 
the mother, the father and the child as three separate agents with individual preferences. 
The two parents’ interaction is modeled within the collective model framework by 
assuming that they will reach Pareto efficient resource allocation between them. In order 
to capture the dynamics between parents and the child, parents-child interaction is 
modeled in a two-stage Stackleberg game structure where the child is allowed to have 
certain decision choices of his/her own. This game structure allows us to explore the 
parental influence on the child’s health outcomes while allowing the child to have 
influencing power in the household decision-making process. 
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Based on this theoretical model, a general triangular system with one child’s health 
production equation and five health inputs demand equations is derived and estimated. 
The empirical estimation is performed for three systems: pooled model, the younger 
children model (of age 9 to 11), and the older children model (of age 13 to 15).  
The empirical results show mother-related variables show more influence on the 
child’s Body Mass Index (BMI) outcomes compared to father-related variables: 
mothers’ BMI and mothers’ work-to-home stress spillover are positively related to their 
children’s BMI while mothers’ time spent with their children is negatively related to 
their children’s BMI. There exists a complementary relationship between mothers’ 
income and fathers’ food preparation time. In the older children model, mothers’ own 
income increases tend to decrease their time spent with their children. 
The main contribution of this study is that it develops a general theoretical 
framework to capture the dynamics in parents-child interaction. Based on this theoretical 
model, empirical analysis and future work can be conducted in a theoretically consistent 
way. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.1. Obesity Epidemic 
Overweight and obesity are among the most pressing health challenges today and 
may soon cause as much preventable disease and death as cigarette smoking (US DHHS 
2001a).  Obesity is a growing concern in both developed and developing countries.  New 
figures from the World Health Organization (WHO) indicate that obesity is spreading 
around the world as a “global epidemic.”  According to WHO, globally there are more 
than 1 billion adults who are overweight and at least 300 million of them are clinically 
obese (WHO 2004). 
In the United States, nearly one-third of all adults are obese and 15 percent of 
children and teens aged 6 to 19 are overweight (US DHHS 2002).1 Childhood obesity is 
becoming a major concern in the United States. An estimated 14% of children between 
the ages of 6 and 17 have a body mass index (BMI) for their age that is indicative of at-
risk for overweight; an additional 11% have a BMI for their age that is considered to be 
overweight (Troiano and Flegal).  
This increased prevalence of childhood obesity is a major concern for our society 
because obese children will likely become obese adults and many adult health problems, 
such as diabetes and heart problems, are associated with obesity. Therefore, the 
economic costs of obesity are significant.  From 1979 to 1999, annual hospital costs for 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
 
1 The preferred term in addressing excess weight in children is overweight. 
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treating children’s obesity-related diseases rose from $35 million to $127 million (Wang 
and Dietz).  The average obese adult spends nearly $400 more per year on medical 
expenses compared to a healthy-weight adult (Sturm).  Nationally, the U.S. Surgeon 
General estimates that the annual cost of overweight and obesity is nearing $117 billion 
(US DHHS, 2001b).  
 
1.2. Changes in the Parental Time Allocation 
The factors affecting the childhood obesity are many and not well understood. In 
the standard nutrition literature, obesity is a function of the balance between energy 
intake and energy expenditure (Hoffman and Sawaya).2 Energy intake and expenditure 
are influenced by genetic factors and environmental factors. One environmental factor 
that would seem to be important is parental time allocated to their children.  
Adult time allocation has changed greatly over the last three decades as more 
women have entered the labor force. Less time at home and more time at work results in 
less time available for food preparation and active leisure (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer). 
Meanwhile, technological changes have occurred in the food sector: the switch from 
individual to mass preparation has led to increased quantity and variety of food 
consumed (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro). One would expect that parental decision-
making on time allocation could play a significant role in children’s physical health 
production: higher frequency of family meal skipping, declined activity time with their 
                                                 
2 The details will be presented in the theoretical chapter (Chapter III). 
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children and increased convenience food consumption will be likely to negatively impact 
children’s diet patterns and lifestyles, ceteris paribus.  
 
1.3. Economic Literature Overview 
Unfortunately, the effect of parental time allocation and other parental factors on 
children’s physical health outcomes is an area of research that needs more theoretically 
consistent study.3  For many years, the economic framework for analyzing the issue of 
time allocation and household production, such as nutrient intake and children’s 
outcomes, was based on the unitary household production model.  
However, over the last decade major limitations of this model have been 
recognized and the literature has moved to collective models (Vermeulen). The 
collective approach and its refinements have mainly focused on modeling household 
labor supply decision-making (e.g., Chiappori 1997; Apps and Rees 1997). The main 
empirical focus has been on testing the income-pooling hypothesis (e.g., Bourguignon et 
al.), which states that the source of income in the household is irrelevant in consumption 
decisions.  
Most work has modeled the behavior of households without children. Some 
refinements have included children in the model by treating children as public 
consumption goods for adult household members (e.g., Bourguignon). In terms of child-
related issues, some researches have considered the costs of children by treating children 
as individual household members (e.g., Apps and Rees 2002). Some have explored the 
                                                 
3 The detailed literature summary will be presented in the next literature review chapter (Chapter II). 
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impact of fertility or children’s health on parent’s labor supply decision-making (e.g., 
Gould; Xie). Recently, several researchers have investigated the effect of parental time 
allocation on children’s overall quality/performance by treating children and parents as 
separate agents (e.g., Amuwo et al.; Burton, Phipps, and Curtis). 
No known studies, however, have examined the effects of parental time allocation 
on children’s physical health. Conceptually, the literature on the relationship between 
parents and children has not generally incorporated children’s own choices into the 
optimization framework and has worked within a single-headed household model.  
This is not a very appealing approach for considering the influencing factors on 
children’s physical health outcomes (especially obesity-related ones) since children have 
some control over their energy intake and expenditure which are the two key 
components for obesity-related health production. Furthermore, a single-headed 
household model, much like the income pooling hypothesis, implicitly treats all time 
allocated to the children as the same regardless of the source, i.e., the mother’s time or 
the father’s time. Consequently, the potential difference of time allocation effects 
between mothers and fathers cannot be assessed.  
Perhaps the main reason for these conceptual limitations has been the lack of data 
rich enough to consider more sophisticated models. That is, it has been difficult to 
investigate the relationship between parental time allocation (including market work, 
housework, time spent with the child and personal leisure) and children’s physical health 
outcomes. The desirable data set should not only include children’s health status and 
nutrient intake information but also have detailed parental time diary records on 
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individual levels. As Haveman and Wolfe pointed out, many existing data sets cannot 
meet this degree of richness resulting in a “variable scarcity” problem. 
 
1.4. Objectives of This Study 
This study aims to explore the influence of parental time allocation choices and 
other parental factors on children’s obesity-related health outcomes and examine the 
potential differences between the marginal effects of paternal choices and maternal 
choices.  
A theoretical model that includes children’s obesity-related health production and 
parental time allocation will be presented. The model treats the mother, the father and 
the child as three separate agents with individual preferences. The interaction between 
the two parents is modeled within the collective model framework by assuming that the 
two parents will reach Pareto efficient resource allocation between themselves. In order 
to capture the dynamics within household decision-making between parents and children, 
the theoretical framework will model parents-child interaction in a two-stage game 
structure where the child is allowed to have certain decision choices of his/her own.  
From this theoretical framework, we are able to derive the children’s obesity-
related health production function (which is a structural equation from the parents’ point 
of view). The empirical set up chapter will present this structural equation along with 
other five reduced form health input equations as a general triangular system for 
estimation. 
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This study utilizes a complex data set which fills the gap in the data needs for this 
type of multi-disciplinary research. The details about the unique characteristics of this 
data set and the survey instruments are reported. This data set makes it possible for us to 
explore the individual parental influences and the potential differences between the 
fathers and the mothers. 
Chapter II will summarize the related economic and sociological theory 
development and empirical findings. The theoretical chapter, Chapter III, will present 
detailed theoretical model set up and model derivation along with comparative statics 
results and discussions. Based on the theoretical model framework laid out, Chapter IV 
will derive a general triangular system of equations and discuss the empirical estimation 
strategies. The data and summary statistics chapter, Chapter V, will describe this unique 
data set in detail and discuss the variable generation process and summary statistics for 
those variables of interest. Chapter VI is the results chapter where the empirical 
estimation results on the general triangular system will be discussed and summarized. 
Finally, Chapter VII will conclude the main content and findings of this study and 
describe future research possibilities. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study focuses on exploring the influence of parental factors on children’s 
obesity-related health outcomes in a theoretically consistent way. The research falls 
naturally into the area of “household production of health” (HHPH) (Berman, Kendall, 
and Bhattacharyya).4 There are numerous combinations of determinants that a household 
can adapt to maintain a certain level of health. HHPH is a topic being studied by a 
variety of disciplines: anthropology, social psychology, and economics. Each discipline 
has its own sets of factors and model frameworks to work on although they do overlap to 
a certain degree. To conduct a thorough examination on HHPH calls for interdisciplinary 
quantitative and qualitative research work (Berman, Kendall, and Bhattacharyya; 
Haveman and Wolfe). 
This study incorporates sociological factors into economic analysis so a summary 
of economic theory framework development and the sociological literature will be 
presented here. In terms of economic literature, there has been an enormous amount of 
work done on household behavior modeling both in theoretical development and in 
empirical applications (Gronau 1986, 1997).5 However, there is little research on 
examining the influence of parents on their children’s health outcomes. The children’s 
                                                 
4 HHPH is defined as: “A dynamic behavioral process through which households combine their (internal) 
knowledge, resources, and behavior norms and patterns with available (external) technologies, services, 
information, and skills to restore, maintain, and promote the health of their members.” (Berman, Kendall, 
and Bhattacharyya). 
5 The empirical implementation covers labor supply, inequality, costs of children, and children’s 
attainments etc. 
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attainment literature does explore the influence of the parental choices on children’s 
attainment. But in those studies, the attainment definition does not include children’s 
obesity-related health outcomes and time allocation choices of both parents are not 
considered as potential determinants. This chapter will summarize the theory 
development and empirical results that focus on children outcomes and intra-family time 
allocation. 
 
2.1. Economic Theory Summary 
Becker (1965) introduced the household production model (HPM) into the 
traditional consumer behavior analysis, which began the so-called “new household 
economics” (NHE). NHE brings together the theories of production and consumption 
into a more coherent theory of household behavior and recognizes time as a valuable 
household resource. 
In the HPM, households are producers as well as consumers. Households demand 
market goods and services and then combine them with the household members’ own 
time and capacities to produce the final products desired by the households. One of the 
household goods produced can be children’s health outcomes, which are an obvious 
source of satisfaction many households would seek to attain. Within this HPM 
framework, the theory development has gone through several waves of modifications. 
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2.1.1. Unitary model of children’s health outcomes 
In the original HPM of Becker, the household acts as a single decision-making unit 
even though the household consists of different individuals. The original Becker model 
depicts a single household decision-maker case and the model only considers a two-way 
time exchange: the household production time and market work time. The single 
decision-maker will maximize a single household utility function subject to a pooled 
household budget, household production functions, and time constraint.  
Gronau (1973, 1977) expanded Becker’s model into a two-person household and 
introduced a third time use – leisure – as opposed to home production time in general.6 
However, Gronau’s model still treats the objective function as a single household utility 
function. 
In order to clearly present the structure difference between the unitary model and 
the models emerging later on, we will slightly extend the Becker-Gronau model into a 
multi-person household with two parents and one child. Also, in order to put it into the 
children’s health household production related framework, we limit the household 
production to only the children’s health production. 
Let us define a utility function for a household consisting of two working parents 
(F, M) and one child (C) as: 
(2.1) ),,,,( Ml
F
l
MF ttyxxuU = , 
where u is a strongly quasi-concave, increasing and twice continuously differentiable 
function in its arguments. There are two vectors of parents’ individual private good 
                                                 
6 See Gronau 1973 paper models a two-person household and introduces the leisure time. His 1977 paper 
focuses on time allocation and simplifies the model back to depict a single person household. 
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consumptions, ),( MF xx , the household produced child’s health outcome, (y), and the 
two parents’ individual leisure time, ),( Ml
F
l tt .  
The single household decision-maker faces a household production constraint, a 
household budget constraint, and two parents’ time constraints. The household child’s 
health production constraint is defined as: 
(2.2) );,,( μMyFy ttmyy = . 
The production function has a vector of the child’s health production inputs, (m), and the 
two parents’ time spent on the production of household goods y, ),( My
F
y tt . There is also 
an initial endowment vector μ of human capital inputs to domestic production. The 
production function exhibits positive decreasing marginal productivity.  
The pooled household budget constraint is: 
(2.3) ∑ +≤+ i iiwi Itwmpxp )(21  MFi ,= . 
The vector of market goods x ( ),( MF xxx = ) has a price vector p1, and the household 
production input vector m has a price vector p2. The household total income consists of 
two parents’ earned income and unearned income: wi is the market work wage rate for 
adult i and iI  is the individual unearned income of member i. The individual i’s market 
work time is denoted as iwt . 
In addition to the above two constraints, the household decision-maker also faces 
two individual time constraints: 
(2.4) Tttt Fl
F
w
F
y =++  
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(2.5) Tttt Ml
M
w
M
y =++ . 
Under the assumption of non-satiation, the resulting full income constraint from 
combining (2.1.3), (2.1.4) and (2.1.5) is: 
(2.6) ∑∑∑ +=+=+++ i ii iii iliyi ITwITwttwmpxp )()(21 , MFi ,= , 
where the aggregate unearned income I equals the sum of the two individual unearned 
incomes ( MF III += ). 
The household decision-maker maximizes the single household utility function 
(equation (2.1)) while facing the household child’s health production constraint 
(equation (2.2)) and the household full income constraint (equation (2.1.6)). The 
maximization results in a set of unconditional demand functions for market goods, health 
production inputs and leisure: 
(2.7a) ),,,,,,( 21 μITwwppgq MF= , 
where ),,,,,,( Ml
F
l
M
y
F
y
MF ttttmxxq =  and g is a vector valued function. After substituting 
those optimal solutions (equation (2.7a)) back into the children’s health production 
function, we will get the indirect children’s health production function  
(2.7b) ),,,,,,( 21 μITwwppfy MF= . 
These demand functions (equation (2.7a)) have theoretically well-known properties: 
adding up, homogeneity, Slutsky symmetry, negativity. However, empirical testings of 
these properties repeatedly rejected them, with the exception of the natural adding up 
condition (see Vermeulen for detailed references). Another empirical restriction 
resulting from the unitary HPM is the so-called “income pooling hypothesis” and it has 
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been universally rejected in the literature (e.g. Bourguignon et al.; Lundberg, Pollak, and 
Wales). The “income pooling hypothesis” states that the household pools all nonlabor 
income together to optimize the household utility, however, the source of unearned 
income does not affect the intra-household resource allocation. This restriction also can 
be shown in the equation (2.7a) where fathers’ and the mothers’ unearned income 
demand marginal effects are the same: 
I
g
I
g
I
g
MF ∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂ . 
These empirical drawbacks give rise to many alternative approaches that realize 
that different preferences of the household members, as well as the existence of 
dominance or power relations within the household, are important and should be 
modeled. These alternative models fall under the heading of non-unitary models. 
 
2.1.2. Non-unitary model (collective model) of children’s health outcomes 
The emerging alternative approaches all try to take the intra-household decision-
making process out of the black box.  They treat the household members as distinct 
individuals with common interests as well as conflicts. These approaches differ in the 
assumptions imposed on the intra-household decision-making process. 
The game theoretical framework is naturally applied to model this complex intra-
household decision-making process. Some refer to noncooperative game theory and 
some utilize the axiomatic bargaining approach (e.g. McElroy).7 The former describes 
the household decision-making process as a game between participants, however, the 
efficiency will not be able to be gained in most cases. The cooperative bargaining 
                                                 
7 See Vermeulen for detailed references. 
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approach will certainly lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. However, both approaches 
impose certain assumptions on the decision-making process which specifically lead to 
particular equilibrium and the bargaining rules imposed cannot be tested apart from the 
collective setting (Chiappori 1988). 
Instead of imposing a particular bargaining rule, Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Apps 
and Rees (1988) developed what is called the collective model: they assume only that 
the household decision-making process will always result in Pareto efficient outcomes. 
In other words, at the optimal point no household members can gain more without 
hurting the other members. This Pareto efficiency assumption has been justified as the 
natural result of repeated long-term games, with the household dynamic as one example 
(Browning and Chiappori). Apps and Rees (1996, 1997, 2002) and Chiappori (1997) 
introduced household production into this collective framework. This section will follow 
their collective model setup to present the framework and contrast it with the above 
unitary HPM. 
The collective method models household individuals with unique preferences. Let 
us define the two parents’ individual utility functions as: 
(2.8) ),,( il
ii
i tyxuu =  MFi ,= . 
So, the individual adults in the household will gain utility from their own market goods 
consumption, (xi), the household produced child’s health outcome, (y), and their own 
leisure time, ( ilt ). This is an egoistic preference setting and can be easily extended to 
accommodate difference preference assumptions (e.g., caring, Beckerian, etc.). The 
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utility function of the child can be defined on its own market goods consumption, xC, and 
the household-produced child’s own health outcomes, y: 
(2.9) ),( yxuu CCC = . 
All utility functions are strictly quasi-concave and increasing in their arguments, and at 
least twice continuously differentiable. 
The constraints in the collective model are similar to those in the unitary model 
presented in section 2.1. Most works using the collective model focus on childless 
households. A few studies treat children as individual household members (Apps and 
Rees 2002; Bourguignon). However, they do not model children as contributors in the 
household production process. Children do not have influencing power over home 
production and the household decision-making process in those models. So the multi-
person household’s children’s health production function remains the same as the unitary 
model (equation 2.2). The full-income constraint is also similar to equation (2.6) except 
the vector of market goods x now has one more component (the child’s own market good 
consumption): ),,( CMF xxxx = . 
The fundamental difference between the collective model and the unitary model is 
that the household maximization problem now is modeled in a Pareto efficiency setting: 
household members will maximize their own utility function while making sure that 
other members’ reservation utility levels are met. The household maximization problem 
can be presented as: 
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),,(
),,,,,,(
F
l
FF
ttttxxx
tyxuMax
M
l
F
l
M
y
F
y
CMF
 
s.t. 
MM
l
MM utyxu ≥),,(  
 
CCC uyxu ≥),(  
 );,,( μMyFy ttmyy =  
 ∑∑∑ +=+=+++ i ii iii iliyi ITwITwttwmpxp )()(21 . 
where 
M
u and 
C
u are the mother’s and the child’s reservation utility levels, respectively. 
All Pareto efficient allocations can be traced by varying the reservation utility levels. 
Apps and Rees (2002) treat children as individual household members with unique own 
preferences. They assume that the children’s reservation utility constraint is not binding 
and can be ignored.8 So the Lagrangian of this maximization problem does not have a 
children’s utility function in it.  
Based on the assumptions that the individual utility functions are strongly concave 
and the budget constraint is a convex set, the utility possibility set is strictly convex. So, 
the above maximization problem can be rewritten as: 
),,(),,,,,( 21
),,,,,,(
F
l
FFMF
MF
ttttxxx
tyxuIIwwppWUMax
M
l
F
l
M
y
F
y
CMF
=  
     ),,()],,,,,(1[ 21 Ml
MMMF
MF tyxuIIwwppW−+  
subject to the production constraint (equation (2.2)) and the household full income 
constraint (equation (2.6)). W and (1-W) are positive welfare weights attached to the two 
                                                 
8 So the weighted household utility function does not have child’s utility as one of the components. This 
formulation does not allow the children to have their own choices to influence the intra-household 
allocation process. 
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parents. They are the normalized Lagrangian multipliers from the previous maximization 
problem and depend on the exogenous variables of the model. They represent the 
bargaining power of household members in the intra-household resource allocation 
process. The solutions to this maximization problem are a set of unconditional demands: 
(2.10) ),,,,,,,( 21 μMFMF IITwwppgq = , 
where ),,,,,,,( Ml
F
l
M
y
F
y
CMF ttttmxxxq = .  
Now, the sources of the household members’ individual nonlabor income are 
important to intra-household resource allocation. The change in individual unearned 
income will affect intra-household consumption and time allocation in two ways: the 
usual income effect through the household budget constraint, and the bargaining power 
effect through shifting individual welfare weight. The same arguments can be applied to 
market goods prices and individual market work wage rates. 
 
2.1.3. Other children-related modeling framework modifications 
Most work on collective models has targeted either single-person households or 
childless two-person households. This section will focus only on those works that 
explore the parental influences on children outcomes (either health or other attainments). 
The unitary HPM has a dimension, Becker’s “Rotten Kid Theorem”, that actually 
tries to reconcile the unitary model with the fact that households may consist of multiple 
decision makers. This theorem describes family members’ interaction in a household 
with a benevolent household head and several family members as beneficiaries. It states 
that the selfish household members will maximize the total household income even 
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without the presence of a pre-committed incentive plan, if the benevolent household 
head can redistribute the total household income as gifts to household members. In other 
words, if certain conditions are met, the altruistic parents and their selfish children will 
all maximize the same utility function. As Bergstrom points out, this theorem still 
requires transferable preferences and a specific decision process for it to hold true.  
However, it is worth mentioning that this theorem is built upon a two-stage “game” 
(Becker 1981): the children get to choose their behavior in the first stage; then the 
parents will decide on how to distribute the gifts to their children after observing their 
behavior (set of children’s action choices). This can be put into standard principal-agent 
theory language.9 Cigno, Luporini, and Pettini also introduce the principal-agent 
framework into children attainment analysis, although they model the government as the 
principal and the parents as the agents. The incentive model has been utilized in some 
studies to show parents-child interaction within the family, however, they focus only on 
the mechanism designs of parental pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives for inducing 
child obedience (See Weinberg for detailed literature survey). Burton, Phipps and Curtis 
develop a model to depict parents-child interaction within the family as a simple 
mechanism design with certain incomplete information from the child. In their model, 
the children’s behavior is measured with an index of conduct disorder/physical 
aggression. 
The two-stage game is an intuitive way to treat the parents and the child as separate 
agents and model parents-child interaction. The literature utilizing the incentive theory 
                                                 
9 It will be presented in details in the following theoretical chapter (Chapter III). 
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to model household behavior does not explore the influence of parents (especially the 
parental time allocation choices effect) on children’s health outcomes. This study will 
actually examine this topic by utilizing a similar framework in part of the theoretical 
modeling. 
The area that has received the most attention is modeling the cost of children. 
Bourguignon modeled children as public consumption goods by the two adult members 
of a household. Apps and Rees (2002) treat children as individual household members 
with their own distinct preferences. However, children are not modeled to have any 
participation in the household production process, which does not hold true for the 
children’s own health production. 
Hallberg and Klevmarken contribute to children attainment literature by 
emphasizing that, in the collective HPM where children’s quality is produced, parental 
time with children, market work time and parental leisure time are interdependent. They 
also introduce the “process benefits” concept which first appeared as the time-involved 
household production and joint production properties pointed out by Pollak and Wachter. 
This concept stresses that the time spent in an activity may bring direct well-being to the 
individual independent of the activity outcomes. The implication of this concept is that 
the utility function should include other time devotion choices as arguments, as well as 
own leisure time. This study will also model the joint production effects. 
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2.2. Economic Empirical Results Summary 
Haveman and Wolfe have an extended survey of children attainment literature 
through 1993.  In the children attainment literature, a variety of measures have been 
considered: for example, categorical dummy variables, such as whether the children 
graduated from high school; and continuous variables, such as children’s future annual 
earnings. However, no works actually look at parental influences on children’s health 
outcomes. Most empirical research does not have a common framework to direct model 
specification and relevant variable selection (Haveman and Wolfe), which leads to 
arbitrary choices of variable combinations. Haveman and Wolfe also point out that few 
studies actually recognize the interdependence among variables and systematically 
model that interaction. 
Recent literature has moved towards modeling parents-child interaction in order to 
derive a theory-based empirical framework. This section will actually focus on 
presenting these studies. 
Burton, Phipps and Curtis recognize that the previous children’s attainment 
literature does not model the child himself/herself as a participant in the child attainment 
production process. They develop a simple game to model the two-way interaction 
between parents and the child. In their model, the parents will choose a “parenting 
strategy” while considering all the possible actions of the child (child’s behavior 
choices). The parents have incomplete information about the child’s mood and the 
principal-agent framework fits well for modeling this incomplete information. Their 
theory derivation leads to a simultaneous system of equations with a parenting style 
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equation and a child behavior equation. They do not define the children behavior 
specifically in the theoretical model and use an index of conduct disorder/physical 
aggression to represent the child’s behavior in the empirical analysis. They define the 
parenting strategy as an index of punitive/aversive parenting responses. Additionally, 
their model does not consider parental time allocation choices and children’s health 
outcomes. 
The data set they employed is the 1994 Canadian National Longitudinal Survey of 
Children and Youth (NLSCY). They studied children aged 6 to 11, living in two-parent 
families. The sample size is about 8,481 children. The endogeneity tests suggest that 
parenting style is not exogenous to child behavior and vice versa, so 3SLS and OLS 
estimators are presented. Their results suggest that socioeconomic factors (e.g., family 
size, age and gender of the child, mother’s age) and parenting style are important 
determinants of child behavior, and that parenting strategy is affected by parent’s life 
stress and the child’s behavior. 
Weinberg investigates the relationship between parental income and children’s 
outcomes using an incentive model design. In his economic model, children choose their 
own actions while parents seek to influence these choices through providing pecuniary 
incentives. He used the data from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and ran probit regressions of withdrawal of allowance 
and the use of corporal punishment on a cubic in family income and the characteristics 
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of the child, family and primary caregiver.10 The results suggest that the parents’ ability 
to mold their children’s behavior through pecuniary incentives is limited at low incomes 
and this leads to increasing reliance on non-pecuniary mechanisms such as corporal 
punishment. 
Most of the economic literature on household behavior modeling does not model 
children as individual household members. For those that do include children in their 
models, the children are either public goods for the household adults or do not 
participate in the household production and have no decision power in the household. 
Recent approaches start to introduce incentive theory to model parents-child interaction 
but they do not consider the children’s health outcomes and the parents’ individual time 
allocation choices. This study tries to fill this gap by developing a theoretical framework 
to depict this aspect of family dynamics. 
 
2.3. Sociological Theory and Empirical Results Summary 
This study develops a multi-disciplinary model structure that covers both economic 
factors and sociological aspects of family dynamics. It is important to cover the 
sociological literature in this chapter and a detailed literature review can be found in the 
project report by McIntosh, et al. 
There are several factors sociology considers in the HHPH: role theory, work 
flexibility, work commitment, work-to-home spillover, parents’ power difference, and 
heredity. 
                                                 
10 Withdrawal of allowance and the use of corporal punishment are the two indexes he used to capture the 
children’s behavior. 
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Role theory in sociology states that there are many socially prescribed roles that 
individuals take on. Adults may be employee, spouse, parent, etc., while the child may 
be student, friend, etc. Each role has its own associated standard of fulfillment and 
demands individual resource allocation to a certain extent. One of the most highly 
demanded resources is individual time. This has been recognized in economic literature, 
as discussed in previous sections. When role demands exceed the time and energy 
resources of an individual, there will be either conflict between different roles or within 
the same role where partners share the work load (e.g., spouse) (Pearlin). 
For working parents, stress can be an important factor affecting behavior. One 
obvious stress source is work. The sociological literature has found negative emotional 
and physical consequences associated with work stress caused by work demands that are 
beyond the employee’s ability to handle (e.g. Karlsson, Knuttson, and Lindahl.; Rau and 
Triemer). Work flexibility and work commitment are also found to be two important 
causes of this type of work stress. Those employees who have less flexibility in their 
work schedules (work hours or work days arrangements) are found to have more work 
stress and health consequences. Their household labor division will also be affected by 
work flexibility which may tend to create conflicts between spouses. Meanwhile, 
Laedwig and McGee point out the positive relationship between work commitment and 
marital conflict. Those who have high work commitment may devote less time and 
energy to other family members and the quality of family time will be negatively 
affected. 
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Also, several other studies suggest that work stress can lead to tension in spousal 
relationships and have a negative impact on parents-child interaction (e.g. Crouter and 
Bumpus; Kinnunen, Geurts, and Mauno). This describes another sociological factor in 
family life: some roles’ conflict spills over to other roles (affects the other roles’ 
fulfillment). The most relevant spillover that affects the parents-child and spousal 
relationships is the work-to-home spillover. Parents’ work stress may be carried over 
into family interactions. The emotional burden, physical exhaustion and overtime work 
demands will affect marital satisfaction and negatively affect the quality and quantity of 
parental time with their children. 
Work flexibility, work commitment and work-to-home spillovers are all found to 
affect family eating habits. Devine et al. found that women who have high work stress 
and experience work-to-home spillover will have greater frequency of skipping meals, 
eating out and purchasing “junk food” for family meals. However, most of the literature 
on work stress and spillover health consequences is concerned with the employees 
themselves, not their family members (e.g., their children). 
The sociological literature also shows that the power difference between husband 
and wife will benefit the one with the higher status (e.g., Blumberg). This suggests the 
potential linkage between parents’ power differences and household decision-making.  
Heredity has also been proved to be an important factor in children’s intake and 
outcomes. Several studies (e.g., Agras et al.) have suggested the positive relationship 
between parental BMI and their children’s BMI. 
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As mentioned before, a lot of research in the field of sociology has focused on 
health determinants. Within this literature, some have considered children’s health 
outcomes, but they do not specifically analyze parental time devotion effects on 
children’s health outcomes and there is no common framework to guide the empirical 
variable selection. 
 
2.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a brief summary of related literature on economic and 
sociological theory development and empirical work.  
In the economic field, most of the household behavior studies do not model 
children as individual household members. For those that do include children in their 
models, children either are public goods for the household adults or do not participate in 
the household production and have no decision power in the household. This is not 
appropriate for modeling children’s health production. Recent approaches start to 
introduce incentive theory to model parents-child two-way interaction but they do not 
consider the effects of parents’ individual time allocation choices on children’s health 
outcomes.  
Some sociology studies have considered children’s health determinants but they do 
not specifically analyze the parental time devotion effects and there is no common 
framework to guide empirical variable selection. Thus, empirical examinations were 
conducted over sets of arbitrarily chosen potential determinants. 
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So, although there are huge amounts of related literature in the fields of economics 
and sociology, this chapter focuses on summarizing only those recent developments that 
consider children’s outcomes and model parents-child interaction.  
This study tries to fill the gap by developing a theoretical framework to depict 
parents-child two-way interaction in order to explore the influence of parents on 
children’s health outcomes. The model incorporates both economic and sociological 
factors and the theoretical model guides the empirical analysis. 
The following chapter will present the detailed model structure and derivation. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
3.1. General Model Set Up 
The focus of this dissertation is investigating parental time effects on children’s 
health production outcome, more specifically obesity-related health measures. The 
theoretical model extends Becker’s household production model to a multi-person 
household consisting of two parents and one child. Also, the model allows each 
individual to allocate his own time among different activities: parents will be able to 
decide on time allocation among market work, home production, parents-child activities 
and other residual time; the child will be able to decide his/her own time allocation 
among food consumption, exercise and other residual time. Our model differs from those 
in previous literature by allowing the child to have his/her own choices instead of being 
treated as a public good (Bourguignon) or as an individual household member without 
any household decision power (Apps and Rees 2002). Home production is limited to the 
child’s obesity-related health production as this is the focus of our study. 
Our model considers a multi-person household with two parents and one child, 
each with his/her own utility function. We are interested in the interaction between 
parents and the child, so we model the parents-child interaction as a two-stage 
Stackleberg game while keeping collective modeling structure within the father-mother 
interaction. By doing so, we are able to disentangle the individual parent’s interaction 
with the child and the game structure allows us to derive the partial reduced form of the 
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child’s health production function with parental time allocation variables as arguments. 
This enables us to empirically analyze the effect of parental time allocation and other 
parental factors on the child’s health production outcomes. 
 
3.1.1. Defining obesity-related health production function 
In order to define the obesity-related health production function and its 
components, this dissertation follows the nutrition literature. According to Hoffman and 
Sawaya, the metabolism of nutrients (i.e., energy) in the human body is mainly about 
energy balance: Energy Intake = Energy Output. As they point out, it follows the First 
Law of Thermodynamics in that the energy is not created or destroyed within a closed 
system, but only changes form. The human body is able to store excess energy for usage 
during an energy deficient period. So the energy balance formula can be rewritten as the 
following:  
(3.1) Energy Intake = Energy Output ±  Energy Stored.  
Obesity is “having a fat mass larger than what is considered healthy” (Hoffman and 
Sawaya) and this links to excess energy intake compared to energy output. So the 
children’s obesity-related health production function should have two main components: 
energy intake and energy output. 
We define children’s obesity-related health as H, determined by the following 
production function based on equation (3.1): 
(3.1’) ),( OIHH = ,  
  
28
where I is the nutrient intake measurement and O is the energy output measurement. 
Hoffman and Sawaya point out that the intake of nutrients is influenced by numerous 
factors. We define the nutrient intake production function components based on those 
factors:  
1. Food availability. We use the following six variables to capture food 
availability: child’s time spent in food consumption (tf), child’s food input 
choice made by self (xf), child’s food input choice made by father ( FfX ), 
child’s food input choice made by mother ( MfX ), father’s time spent in 
food preparation ( FfT ), and mother’s time spent in food preparation (
M
fT ); 
2. Palatability. We use tf  and child’s type variables (μ, such as gender, 
ethnicity etc.);11 
3. Social and family influences. They are captured by five variables: home 
environment (EH), peer influences (EP), child’s type variable (μ), parent’s 
type variables (ki, where i = F, M, such as parent’s BMI, parents’ power 
difference etc.); 
4. Psychological state of the person. We use type variables for the child and 
the parents (μ and ki, where i = F, M) for this; 
5. Composition of a meal. This is depicted by iff Xx , , and 
i
fT , where i = F, M; 
6. Amount of exercise. We use child’s time spent in exercising (tE) as 
indicator. 
                                                 
11 In our theoretical model, the child’s time spent in food consumption (tf) will enter child’s utility function 
directly to capture another aspect of palatability: tf can bring positive utility to the child. 
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So as defined by the above, we have the following nutrient intake production function:  
(3.2) ),,,,;,,,,,,( MFPH
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
fEff kkEETTXXttxNI μ= .  
N represents nutrient intake. 
Total energy output (or energy expenditure) has three components. The first two 
components (basal metabolic rate and thermogenic component) are related to the 
person’s age, gender, state of health and fitness, etc. The last one (physical activity and 
arousal) depends on the intensity and the duration of the activity involved (Hoffman and 
Sawaya). We use the following three variables to depict these components: child’s type 
variables (μ), parent’s type variables (ki, where i = F, M), and child’s time spent in 
exercising (tE). 
After we have defined the energy intake (I) and energy output (O), the child’s 
obesity-related health production function, equation (3.1’), can be rewritten as:  
(3.3) ),,;,( MFE kktNHH μ= .  
N is the energy intake production function, and the other variables capture energy output. 
Based on equation (3.1’), we combine the two production functions (equation (3.2) and 
equation (3.3)) for our model. And both production functions are assumed to exhibit 
non-increasing returns and to be twice differentiable. 
 
3.1.2. Defining the child’s own utility function 
The utility function of the child is defined on the following components:  
1. The child’s own obesity-related health production outcome (H); 
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2.  All of the child’s time allocation choices: the child’s time spent in food 
consumption (tf), the child’s time spent in exercising (tE), and the child’s 
other residual time (to); 
3. Part of the parental time allocation choices: the parent’s individual time 
spent with the child (parent-child time) ( iCT , i = F, M), the parents’ joint 
time spent with the child (parents-child time) ( JCT ); 
4. Social and family influences: home environment (EH), and peer influence 
(EP). 
So the child’s own utility function is:  
(3.4) ),,,,;,,,( PH
J
C
M
C
F
CoEf EETTTtttHu . 
It is strictly quasi-concave and at least twice continuously differentiable.  
The child divides his own time among food consumption, exercise and other 
residual activities, so he faces the time constraint: 
(3.5) Tttt oEf =++ . 
T is the total time available to the child which we set at 24 hours per day. The child will 
maximize his/her own utility, equation (3.4), by making his/her own decisions on the set 
of choices, ),,,( oEff tttx , while facing two production function constraints (equation (3.2) 
and equation (3.3)) and the time constraint (equation (3.5)). 
The child’s maximization problem set up as defined above does not allow parental 
time spent with the child to enter directly into the child’s health production function. The 
current literature on modeling parental time influence exhibits several ways that the 
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variables can enter the production function directly: parental time allocation can enter 
the household private and public goods multiple output production function (Apps and 
Rees 2002); parental time spent with the child can be arguments in a general child 
quality production function (Hallberg and Klevmarken), and parental time spent with the 
child also can be variables in the child’s effort quality production (Amuwo et al.). In all 
these cases, the parental time variables, especially the time spent with the child, can have 
a direct impact on the production outcome. In other words, they are able to influence the 
general production output level when fixing all other arguments in the production 
function.  
However, the focus of this study is on children’s obesity-related health outcomes 
which are a function of the variables related to the energy intake and energy output 
balance relationship (Hoffman and Sawaya; Pitt, Rosenzwerg, and Hassan; Park and 
Davis). When all the energy intake and energy output related variables are fixed, the 
only way the obesity-related physical health outcome will change is through the person’s 
genetic factor change. Genetics are not influenced by the amount of parental time spent 
with the child. So, in our modeling, the parental time spent with the child only indirectly 
influences the child’s health outcome production through optimal solutions. 
 
3.1.3. Defining the parent’s individual utility function 
The parent’s individual i’s (i = F, M) utility function is defined on the following 
components:  
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1. A composite market consumption good ( ioX ), with the price set to unity. 
This is a private consumption good only consumed by the ith individual 
adult in the household; 
2. All the parental time allocation choices: the parental individual time spent 
with the child ( iCT ), the parental joint time spent with the child (
J
CT ), the 
parental time spent in food preparation ( ifT ), the parental time spent in 
market work ( iwT ), the other residual parental time (
i
oT ); 
3. The family and work place influences: the home environment (EH), and the 
market work environment (Ew); 
4. The child-related factors: the child’s own utility outcome (u), and the 
child’s obesity-related health outcome (H). 
The parent’s individual utility function is then: 
(3.6) ]);(,,,,,,,,[ HuEETTTTTXv WH
i
o
i
w
i
f
J
C
i
C
i
o
i ⋅ , i = F, M. 
Both parent’s individual utility functions are strictly quasi-concave and at least twice 
continuously differentiable.  
We allow the parents to have their individual specific preferences. In the Beckerian 
sense, both of them are “egoistic” toward each other but exhibit the combination of 
“caring” and “altruistic” toward their child. This means that, among the parents, each 
parent’s own consumption and time allocation choices have no effect on the other. 
However, they both care about their child’s welfare --- the child’s utility outcome --- in a 
way that the child’s welfare outcome will bring direct utility to the parents and they do 
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not care how the welfare is achieved except through health outcome. Meanwhile both 
parents do care enough about the child’s obesity-related health outcome that the health 
outcome will directly bring utility to them. They do not merely want their child to feel 
“happy” (achieve its maximum utility level).  Instead, they want the child to have a 
certain level of health outcome even though this may bring the child a certain level of 
disutility.12 
The parents will face two production function constraints (equation (3.2) and 
equation (3.3)), a household budget constraint and two individual time constraints. We 
will discuss these more in the following section. 
In our utility function specifications (for the child and for the parents), the time 
allocation choices not only play roles through constraints but also enter the individual 
utility functions directly. This allows for joint production in household production. 
When time becomes an input in the production of a household commodity, the 
production process exhibits joint production (Becker 1965; Lancaster; Pollak and 
Wachter). In other words, the household individual members derive utility or disutility 
not only from the market goods and the household produced commodities, but also from 
the time they devote to each of the activities (Pollak and Wachter; Hallberg and 
Klevmarken). Hallberg and Klevmarken call the positive utility brought merely from 
devoting time to certain activity the “process benefit”, which means that the activity will 
                                                 
12 For example, the child and his parents may have different perceptions about overweight and obesity. 
The overweight or obese child may not feel any discomfort or he may only feel the peer pressure and self-
esteem struggling; the parents may concern about the child’s health status and related medical burden. 
Then the conflict will arise due to this perception gap. 
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bring certain well-being no matter what the end result is.13 They find from a time-use 
survey that, for both male and female, playing with children and being in charge of 
children gets the highest process benefits scores with the third highest score given to 
market work.14 
 
3.1.4. Defining the parents’ objective function and constraints 
We have defined the parent’s individual utility functions above. Now we need to 
define a “parents’ utility function” in order to analyze the parents-child interaction. That 
is, we need to define the mechanism that the parents use to make purchasing and time 
allocation decisions. Follow the collective modeling approaches, we only assume that 
parents’ decision or exchange process will lead to Pareto efficient equilibrium allocation 
results between parents and it is reasonable in the long-term relationship like household 
members’ interaction (Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1996). 
The Pareto efficiency setting requires that, when one parent is maximizing his/her 
own utility, he/she will make sure that his/her spouse’s utility level at least meets a 
certain reservation utility level v . This reservation utility level, in general, is a function 
of the environment (such as individual wage rate and nonwage income) (Chiappori 1992, 
Apps and Rees 1996). The Lagrangian multiplier of this constraint is, in general, a 
function of these environmental variables and can be interpreted as the implicit weight of 
                                                 
13 For example, the parental time spent with child may not bring immediate positive results to the child’s 
behavior outcome etc. but the parents can derive positive utility from the time they spent with their child 
because  they enjoy being with the child. 
14 It is the Swedish household panel study Household Market and Nonmarket Activities (HUS) time-use 
surveys (1984-1991). 
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the spouse’s egoistic utility in the collective decision process between the two parents 
(Chiappori 1992). Browning and Chiappori call it a “distribution of power” function and 
they point out that it generally depends on the “distribution factors” or the Extra-
Environmental Parameters (EEP’s) (McElroy) that affect the distribution of “power” 
within the household, meaning they influence the “distribution of power” function but do 
not affect the preferences directly.  
In our model, we define this “distribution of power” function as W. It summarizes 
the decision process in a way that determines the final location of the optimal solutions 
on the Pareto frontier. We define it as the function of individual wage rate ( iw ) and the 
individual unearned income ( iI ): ),,,( MFMF IIwwW . 
Then, we can define the parents’ utility function, v, as the following: 
(3.7) +⋅= ]);(,,,,,,,,[ HuEETTTTTXvv WHFoFwFfJCFCFoF        
                            ]);(,,,,,,,,[),,,( HuEETTTTTXvIIwwW WH
M
o
M
w
M
f
J
C
M
C
M
o
MMFMF ⋅ . 
By defining the parents’ objective function (utility function) this way, we implicitly 
normalize the father’s “distribution of power” to 1. The W function here represents the 
ratio of the mother’s power over the father’s power.  Its value is greater than 0 and can 
be greater than 1 in the case of the mother having a larger distribution power in the 
parents decision process. 
The parents face two production constraints (equation (3.2) and equation (3.3)) and 
other constraints. 
They face the household budget constraint: 
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We also normalize the price of the food inputs to unity. The LHS of equation (3.8) can 
be treated as the sum of the expenditures in these two consumption categories. By non-
satiation assumption, the inequality sign can be changed into equality. This means that 
the parents will use up the total income they have to allocate between market good 
consumption and food input choices. 
They also face their individual time constraints: 
(3.9) TTTTTT Fo
F
w
F
f
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C
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C =++++ , and 
(3.10)  TTTTTT Mo
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These two constraints reflect that the parents will devote their time to different activities. 
They will make their decisions on the set of choices, 
),,,,,,,,,,,,( Mo
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f TTTTTTTTTXXXX , to maximize the parents’ utility 
function V, equation (3.7), while facing the two production constraints (equation (3.2) 
and equation (3.3)), the budget constraint (equation (3.8)), and the two individual time 
constraints (equation (3.9) and equation (3.10)). 
 
3.2. Model Structure 
Now that all the variables, utility functions and constraints that go into the model 
have been defined, the decision structure must be discussed. 
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3.2.1. Choosing the game structure 
The literature on interaction among family members refers to the famous “Rotten 
Kid Theorem” presented by Becker. Becker (1981) restated his theorem as: “Each 
beneficiary, no matter how selfish, maximizes the family income of his benefactor and 
thereby internalizes all effects of his actions on other beneficiaries” (pp. 183). This 
theorem deals with family members’ interaction in a household with a benevolent 
household head and several family members as beneficiaries. In our study, the parents 
are acting as a representative benevolent household head while the child is the single 
beneficiary. So, it is reasonable to follow the model structure the “Rotten Kid Theorem” 
utilized. 
As Bergstrom pointed out, “the Rotten Kid theorem can be described succinctly as 
a description of equilibrium in a two-stage game” (pp.1145). In the first stage of the 
game, each beneficiary will choose an “action” which will influence the others’ utilities 
directly; in the second stage of the game, the benevolent household head decides the 
income distribution among the beneficiaries after observing the “action” choices made 
by each family member. The Rotten Kid theorem states that the subgame perfect 
equilibrium for this game is the result the benevolent household head would most prefer 
if he could choose the “action” sets himself. Our study will use the two-stage game 
structure for the model derivation. 
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3.2.2. Choosing the leader 
The two-stage game structure is a leader-follower Stackleberg game structure. So 
the first issue is, between the parents and the child, who will be the leader and who will 
be the follower in our model. 
In the Rotten Kid theorem, the beneficiaries are the leaders who make their action 
choices first and the benevolent head choose the income distribution after he has 
observed the action choices. If stated in incentive theory language, following Bergstrom, 
the Rotten Kid theorem can be stated as: given any action set, a, chosen by the n agents 
(the beneficiaries, with utility functions (u1, u2,…, un)), the utility possibility set, UP(a), 
can be achieved if the available income to distribute is I(a), the income each beneficiary 
receives is ti and they satisfied: )(aIt
i
i =∑ . The theorem claims that, without the 
benevolent head committing to any incentive mechanism beforehand, the family 
members will act as if they are maximizing the household utility instead of maximizing 
their individual utilities. 
However, as Bergstrom points out, if the beneficiaries can act before the household 
head can commit to an incentive scheme, the Rotten Kid theorem cannot generally hold 
without any further assumptions. In our study, if the beneficiary (the child) is the leader 
and the benevolent household head (the parents) is the follower, without any further 
assumptions (such as transferable utility), the child will choose an inefficient (non-
Pareto optimal) choice set (the food choice and time allocation) which he most prefers 
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(his individual utility level is the highest) by distorting the family utility possibility 
frontier in favor of himself.15 The child exhibits obvious manipulating power in this case. 
Let us examine a simple example which follows arguments similar to those made 
by Bergstrom. Let a0 and a1 be two different actions chosen by the child. The respective 
resulting household utility possibility frontiers are: UPF (d, a0) = UPF0 and UPF(d, a1) 
= UPF1, where d represents the parents’ decision choices. The household utility 
possibility frontiers are achieved by the distribution of the parents’ decision choices, 
given the child’s action choice is either a0 or a1. Let I0 and I1 be parents’ (the benevolent 
household head) indifference curves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the manipulating power of the child: If the two utility possibility 
frontiers cross as the way shows in Figure 1, then the child would prefer point A to point 
                                                 
15 See Bergstrom 1989 paper for more detailed discussion on the transferable utility. 
A 
B
The 
child’s 
utility 
The parents’ utility 
(weighted average) 
UPF0 
UPF1 
I0 I1 
Figure 1: Illustration of Child’s Manipulating Power  
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B and parents will prefer point B to point A. So, when the child gets to choose his action 
first, he will choose the action a0 over a1 in order to distort the family utility possibility 
frontier from UPF1 to UPF0. Through this choice, the child can achieve a higher 
individual utility level but at the expense of the parents. 
Because our study explores how parental time allocation can influence the child’s 
obesity-related health outcome, it is more realistic to assume that the parents are the ones 
who set the family rules (act as the leader) and the child is the follower. This child-
parents (the child is the leader) game structure that captures how the child manipulates 
the parents’ decision making does not fit our research purposes. 
 
3.3. Parents-Child Two-Stage Game 
This study employs the following two-stage game structure: the parents are the 
leaders and are able to make decisions over goods consumption, food input purchases 
and time allocations to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes between themselves, while 
taking into account of the child’s behavior responses to their decisions; the child is the 
follower and chooses his/her own decision variables for food input and time allocations 
to maximize his/her own utility function after observing the parents’ decision choices. 
We assume that the parents know each other’s preferences and their interactions 
result in Pareto efficient outcomes between themselves. As Browning and Chiappori 
point out, given this symmetric information flow and the repeated “game” nature of the 
spouses’ interaction in the household, it is plausible that the individual parent finds the 
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mechanism to result in efficient outcomes.16 For parents-child interaction, we also 
assume that the information flow is symmetric and both sides are fully informed: the 
child knows his/her parents’ preferences and is fully aware that his/her responses to the 
parental decisions have been considered by the parents;17 the parents know the child’s 
preference and the ways he/she reacts to their decisions. We do not consider the 
asymmetric information case, where the child hiding certain behavior from the parents, 
for two reasons. First, efficient outcomes are naturally the case resulting from long-term 
interaction in multi-person households, and asymmetric information flow will weaken 
the efficiency conditions. Second, it will complicate our analysis and distract us from the 
purpose of this study. 
 
3.3.1. Child’s decision making 
We follow the backward induction procedure to derive the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of this two-stage model. Because the child is the follower in this model and 
makes decisions in the second stage of the game, we start with the child’s decision-
making process derivation. 
As defined in the previous section, the child’s problem can be presented as: 
),,,,;,,,(
),,,( PH
J
C
M
C
F
CoEftttx
EETTTtttHuMax
oEff
 
  
 
                                                 
16 Given the perfect information assumption, the long-term equilibrium of a repeated noncooperative game 
is often the cooperative results. 
17 So the child knows that he/she can act in certain ways to influence the household decision making 
process. 
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  s.t. ),,;,( MFE kktNHH μ=  
   ),,,,,,,,;,,( MFPH
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
fEff kkEETTXXttxNN μ=  
   Tttt oEf =++  
The child will choose the set, ),,( Eff ttx , to maximize his own utility function while 
taking the parental choices, ),,,,,,( JC
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f TTTTTXX , as given. After substituting 
the constraints back into the utility function, we have the following unconstrained child’s 
utility function: 
     )(,,],,,;),,,,,,,,,;,,([{ EfEf
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The F.O.Cs of this problem imply the following relationships: 
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From equation (3.12) and equation (3.13), we can have the following relationship: 
(3.14) 
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This relationship depicts equilibrium conditions for the child’s optimal time allocation 
choices. The left hand side of equation (3.14) is the partial effect of the child’s time 
spent on food consumption and is a combination of two effects. The first term of the left 
hand side, part (a), shows that the child’s time spent in food consumption brings indirect 
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utility to the child through nutrient production and the resulting health outcome.  The 
second term of the left hand side, part (b), reflects the direct utility/disutility effect the 
child will derive just from spending time on food consumption. If he/she enjoys eating 
the food, then it will capture the “process benefit”: the positive utility derived from 
devoting time to enjoying the food consumption, i.e., enjoying the taste and deriving 
comfort, etc.  
The right hand side of equation (3.14) is the partial effect of the child’s time spent 
in exercising and is also a combination of direct and indirect effects. The first term of the 
right hand side, part (c), shows that exercise brings two indirect effects through health 
outcome production where one indirectly influences the child’s health outcome through 
nutrient intake production and the other directly influence health outcome as energy 
output. The second term of the right hand side, part (d), reflects that exercising time can 
bring direct utility/disutility to the child depending on whether the child enjoys the 
exercise or not. 
Equation (3.14) captures the equilibrium conditions for the child’s time allocation: 
In equilibrium, all the marginal net benefit from eating food (the left hand side of 
equation (3.14)), the marginal net benefit from exercising (the right hand side of 
equation (3.14)) and the marginal cost of loosing other residual time (the middle part of 
equation (3.14)) must be equal to each other. The child will choose to devote his/her own 
time to each of these three activity categories to the point where he gets the same 
marginal utility from all of them. 
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The F.O.Cs of the child’s problem will give us the child’s optimal choice set, 
),,( *** Eff ttx , which are functions of the given parental choices and the other exogenous 
variables: ),,,,,,,,,,,( MFPH
J
C
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f kkEETTTTTXX μ .18 
 
3.3.2. Parents’ decision making 
Parents act as the leader in this model and they make their resource allocation 
decisions in the first stage of the game. They are fully informed on how the child will 
react to the parental decisions they make and will take this into consideration. 
As defined in the previous section, the parents’ problem can be presented as: 
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18 The total time available, T, should be in the optimal solution functions too because it is exogenous to the 
child’s problem also. But because it is constant across individual child (24 hours per day for every child), 
we leave it out in the variables list. 
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The parents will make decisions on the choice set, 
),,,,,,,,,( Mw
F
w
M
f
F
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J
C
M
C
F
C
F
o
M
f
F
f TTTTTTTXXX , to maximize the parents’ utility function, v, 
which is the weighted average of their individual utility functions while taking into 
account their decision consequences (i.e. the child’s response). The variables with an 
asterisk denote that they are the child’s optimal responses to the parents’ decisions. 
After substituting all the constraints into the parents’ utility function, v, the 
unconstrained problem is: 
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The F.O.Cs of this unconstrained problem imply the following relationships:19 
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19 The F.O.Cs presented here are the results of utilizing the F.O.Cs results derived from the child’s 
problem. 
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The iΔ , with ),,,,,,,,( MwFwMfFfJCMCFCMfFf TTTTTTTXXi = , is the simplified notation for the 
following: 
 
di
dHvWv MH
F
Hi
*
])([ ⋅+=Δ , with 
i
tH
i
tN
i
t
N
i
x
NH
di
dH E
t
E
t
f
t
f
xN EEff ∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=
*****
)( . 
All the iΔ  capture how the parents will take their child’s responses to the parental 
decisions into consideration: The child will react to each of the parental decision 
variables through making adjustments on his/her optimal allocation choices after 
observing the parental decisions (
i
A
∂
∂ , where ),,( *** Eff ttxA = ). Those child’s optimal 
choices’ adjustments will, in turn, influence the parent’s individual utility function 
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through the child’s obesity-related health production outcome (
di
dH * ). Then, these 
individual parental utility impacts are weighted according to the “distribution power” 
function to arrive at the parents’ utility impact. The consequence impact through the 
child’s utility is zero because the child will balance out the marginal effects when it is 
his/her turn to optimize his/her own utility. In other words, the child will reach 
equilibrium after the parents’ decisions. The consequence terms show only the indirect 
consequence brought about by the child’s reaction through the child’s health production 
function. 
From equation (3.15) to equation (3.17), we have the following relationship:  
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Equation (3.25) shows that parents will balance the marginal indirect utility from 
purchasing food for the child with the marginal direct disutility of loosing their own 
market good consumption while taking into account the later responses from the child. 
Equations (3.18), (3.21), and (3.23) give us the following condition for the father’s 
optimal time allocation choices: 
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Equation (3.19), (3.22), and (3.24) give us the following condition for the mother’s 
optimal time allocation choices: 
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Equation (3.26) and (3.27) show that in equilibrium, the father and the mother will 
devote their individual time to the activities according to the following marginal effect 
rules. Each of them will make sure that the following marginal effects are equal in the 
equilibrium:  
1. Net marginal utility from spending time with child: a combination of the 
direct utility, “process benefit”, from just enjoying spending time with the 
child and the indirect utility through the child’s utility change; 
2. Net marginal utility/disutility from spending time in food preparation: a 
combination of “process benefit” (or “process bad”) just from spending 
time in preparing food and the indirect utility through the child’s health 
outcome production; 
3. Net marginal utility of market work (a combination of direct utility from 
just enjoying working and indirect utility through the income effect on 
market goods consumption; 
4. The marginal disutility caused by the loss of their individual other residual 
time.  
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All of the above marginal effects (except the disutility caused by individual other 
residual time lost) include consideration of the response consequence caused by the 
child’s reaction. 
Now let us take a look at the detailed components of equation (3.26). Part (a) of 
equation (3.26) is the partial impact of the father’s time spent with the child on the 
average weighted parents’ utility and has multiple effects. The first term in part (a) is the 
direct utility effect on the average parents’ utility through father’s individual utility 
change (the father may merely enjoying spending time with the child) and is weighted 
by the father’s weight which is normalized to 1. The second term in (a) is the indirect 
utility effect on the average parents’ utility. It is the weighted average of the father’s and 
mother’s individual indirect utility change caused by the marginal effect on the child’s 
utility. 
Part (b) of equation (3.26) is the partial impact of the father’s market working time 
and has several effects. The first term in part (b) is the direct utility effect on the average 
parents’ utility through the father’s individual utility change (the father may merely 
enjoy working). The second term in part (b) is the income effect on the mother’s market 
good consumption and is weighted by the “distribution of power” function. 
Part (c) of equation (3.26) is the direct disutility impact of the father’s other 
residual time lost on the average parents’ utility through the father’s individual utility 
change. 
Part (d) of equation (3.26) is the partial impact of the father’s time spent on food 
preparation and has multiple effects. The first terms in (d) are the direct utility/disutility 
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effect on the average parents’ utility through the father’s individual utility change (the 
father may or may not enjoy preparing food) and it is weighted by the father’s weight 
which is normalized to 1. The second term in (d) is the indirect utility effects on the 
average parents’ utility and is composed of two kinds of indirect effects: first is the 
weighted average of the father’s and mother’s individual indirect utility effects through 
the child’s utility change caused by the nutrient production influence of FfT ; second is 
the weighted average of the father’s and mother’s individual indirect utility effects 
through the child’s health outcome change (which directly enters both parents’ 
individual utilities) caused by the nutrient production influence of FfT . 
Equation (3.27) is similar to equation (3.26) and its components show the 
equilibrium conditions for the mother’s time allocation choices. The individual parts (a’) 
to (d’) have similar meanings to parts (a) to (d) with the only difference being that the 
direct utility impact on the average parents’ utility is through the mother’s individual 
utility change instead of the father’s and it is weighted by the “distribution of power” 
function, )(⋅W . 
Equation (3.20) is the optimal condition for allocating the parental joint time spent 
with child. It shows that the parents will make a joint decision on the joint time spent 
with their child by balancing the weighted average benefit (direct “process benefit” and 
the indirect utility through child’s utility change) with the weighted average cost of 
losing their individual other residual time. 
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The F.O.Cs of the parents’ problem will give the optimal solutions for 
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3.4. Parental Time’s Partial Effect 
Based on the model derived in the previous section, we can explore parental time’s 
expected partial effect. 
 
3.4.1. The comparative statics results 
As we have derived in the child’s maximization problem, the child’s optimal 
choices, ),,( *** Eff ttx ,  are functions of the given parental choices and the other 
exogenous variables: ),,,,,,,,,,,( MFPH
J
C
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f kkEETTTTTXX μ . Substituting these 
optimal solutions into the child’s nutrient intake production function and the child’s 
obesity-related health outcome production function, we have: ),,;,( *** MFE kktNHH μ= .  
It is clear that the effect of parental time spent with the child, iCT  (with i = F, M, J), 
on the child’s obesity-related health outcome, H, combines several effects:  
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The parental time partial effect on the child’s health outcome is a combination of two 
effects: the indirect marginal effect through nutrient production change (energy intake 
effect) and the indirect marginal effect through exercising time change (energy output 
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effect).  After looking at each component, it is not a straight-forward process to sign the 
parental partial effect, i
CT
H
∂
∂ * , without further assumptions. 
Let us look at the Primal-Dual (P-D) signing equation from our theoretical model 
to see what kind of sign our theory suggests for this parental partial effect, 
i
CT
H
∂
∂ * (Silberberg and Suen, Chapter 7). The comparative statics signing equation for 
i
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H
∂
∂ *  is:20 
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By equation (3.28), the above inequality can be rewritten as: 
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After substituting all the constraints into the child’s utility function, the child’s utility 
maximization problem becomes an unconstrained optimization problem. So the P-D 
relationship is the same as the unconstrained one.  
Although the inequality (3.29) does not have constraints or Lagrangian multipliers 
in it, we still can not sign the partial parental time effect on the child’s health outcome, 
i
CT
H
∂
∂ * . Since the signed inequality (3.29) is still the summation of three separate effects, 
it is hard to untangle without further assumptions. The other two terms in the LHS of the 
                                                 
20 Detailed derivation is available from the author upon request. 
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inequality (3.29) can not be cancelled out because of the generality nature of our model 
structure: parental time spent with the child, iCT  (with i = F, M, J), enters more than one 
first-order condition. As conjugate pairs theorem states, “refutable comparative statics 
theorem will be forthcoming in a maximization model only if a given parameter enters 
one and only one first-order equation.” (Silberberg and Suen, pp.120-121).21 
 
3.4.2. The assumptions needed for signing 
The left hand side of inequality (3.29) is composed of three different effects of 
parental time spent with the child. The first term is the effect on the child’s optimal 
health outcome, the second term is the effect on the child’s optimal exercising time 
allocation and the third term is the effect on the child’s food consumption time allocation. 
In order to sign the parental time partial effect on the child’s optimal health outcome, we 
need to know the signs and magnitudes of the other two partial effects, ( i
C
f
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C
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T
t
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∂ ** , ), and 
we also need to make assumptions on all the cross effects on the child’s utility level. 
Several sign combinations exist. 
Let us see a few examples to illustrate the kind of assumptions needed in order to 
determine the sign of the partial parental time effect. 
First, let us assume that if the father is able to spend more time with the child, the 
child will spend more time exercising and consuming food. We then have: 
                                                 
21 It is for the case of unconstrained optimization problem. 
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t . Also, when a health-conscious father spends more time with the 
child, the child is more likely to develop healthy eating habits and have more health 
consciousness. Then the child’s own health outcome can bring relatively more positive 
marginal utility to the child. This gives us: 0>HT FCu . Furthermore, if we assume that the 
child’s marginal utilities, derived from his/her time allocation over the activities, will be 
increased with the time his/her father spends with him/her, we have: 
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However, we still cannot sign the partial parental effect, F
CT
H
∂
∂ * : it can be positive or 
negative without any magnitude assumptions. Now, if we are willing to assume that the 
magnitudes of the cross effects follow a certain order: 
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means that we assume the father’s time spent with the child will bring more marginal 
effect increases to the child’s other residual time compared to food consumption and 
exercising time. Then we have the following inequality: 
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We can then expect that the partial father time effect on the child’s obesity-related health 
outcome, F
CT
H
∂
∂ * , will have the same sign as the cross effect , HT FCu , which is positive if the 
father is health conscious. Therefore, based on all the assumptions stated above, if the 
father makes a positive impact on the child’s perception of his own health by spending 
time with the child, then the more time the father spends with his child, the healthier his 
child will be. 
If we are willing to assume that the father’s time spent with the child has almost 
no impact on the child’s marginal utility of different time allocations (which may be a 
possible case with teenagers), then we can expect that F
CT
H
∂
∂ *  will have the same sign as 
HT FC
u , because all the cross effects are zero by the assumption: 0===
o
F
Cf
F
CE
F
C tTtTtT
uuu . 
The inequality (3.29) becomes: 0
*
≥∂
∂⋅ F
C
HT T
Hu F
C
. 
If we assume that a father who is concerned about his child’s obesity-related 
health outcome (maybe the child is an overweight child) will spend time trying to 
influence the child to exercise more (be more active) and eat fewer snacks (decrease 
total food consumption), etc., then inequality (3.29) becomes the following based on the 
same cross effects assumptions made before:  
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In this case, if the cross effects have the magnitudes following of 
E
F
Co
F
Cf
F
C tTtTtT
uuu >>  , 
we assume that the father’s time spent with the child may bring greater increase in the 
marginal utility to food consumption time and less increase to the marginal utility of 
exercising time. Under these assumptions, the inequality can be rewritten as: 
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Then F
CT
H
∂
∂ *  will have the same sign as the cross effect, HT FCu . 
Thus, our theoretical model suggested that, without further assumptions, it is 
impossible to sign the partial parental effects on the child’s obesity-related health 
outcomes. 
 
3.4.3. The “distribution of power” function 
In the parents’ maximization problem illustrated in the previous sections, we can 
see that the “distribution of power” function, ),,,( MFMF IIwwW , appears in all first-
order conditions. It is interesting to explore how ),,,( MFMF IIwwW affects the parents’ 
decision making process. 
Take part (a) and (c) in equation (3.23) as an example:  
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If this equilibrium condition results in a certain level of the father’s time spent with the 
child, *FCT , and if the mother’s utility weight within the household increases (maybe due 
to government policy or market wage rate increases for the mother), then the total value 
of part (b) and part (d) in equation (3.30) will increase and will result in the following 
inequality:23  
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In order to come back to equilibrium, the father will reallocate his time devotion 
choices. By the decreasing marginal utility assumptions, we have: 
0,0
22
<∂∂
∂<∂∂
∂
F
C
F
C
F
C
F
C
F
TT
u
TT
v . 
To decrease the total value of the left hand side of inequality (3.31), the father should 
increase his time spent with the child from *FCT to 
**F
CT (
**F
CT >
*F
CT ). This will then 
simultaneously decrease the total value of the terms inside of the brackets on the left 
hand side by the decreasing marginal utility assumptions.  
However, the impact on the last term, part (e), of the left hand side of inequality 
(3.31), still requires more assumptions. If more of the father’s time spent with the child 
                                                 
22 It is the result after substituting the F
CT
Δ into the equation. 
23 Mother’s utility weight increase means that the “distribution of powers”, )(⋅W , increases. It is the ratio 
of mother’s utility weight over father’s utility weight. 
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brings decreasing marginal health consequence effects, 0
*2
<F
C
F
C dTdT
Hd , then 
increasing FCT  will bring a total of three decreasing effects to the left hand side of 
inequality (3.31) (part (a), (c) and (d)) until the inequality reaches equilibrium again.  
This example shows how the parents’ “distribution of power” function, W, can 
influence the parents’ time allocation decision choices. 
 
3.5. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we lay out the theoretical foundation for our analysis. A household 
with two parents and one child is modeled. We combine the household production 
theory and the collective household modeling structure to capture the dynamics taking 
place in this multi-person household. Because the focus of our study is on the impact of 
parental time allocation choices on the child’s obesity-related health outcomes, 
household production is limited to the child’s obesity-related health production. The 
nutrition literature helps us to define two household production functions which generate 
a nested health production constraint for the model. 
The two parents and one child all have their own specific preferences and the child 
is allowed to have his own decision choices. The interaction between the parents and the 
child is modeled as a two-stage Stackleberg game. The parents act as the leader by 
setting up the family rules and making parental decisions first while taking into account 
the child’s possible responses to their decisions. The child is the follower who makes his 
own decisions after observing the parental choices made in the first stage. This game 
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structure allows us to explore parental influence on the child’s health outcome while 
allowing the child to have some say so in the household decision making process. 
Based on the theoretical model presented in this chapter, an empirical model is 
derived and will be presented in the following chapter. The theory helps us to specify the 
empirical model and the data in a theoretically consistent way. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
In the previous chapter, a Stackleberg game structure is developed for a household 
with two parents and one child. Each has his/her own specific preferences and the child 
is able to influence the family decision-making process by having his/her own choices. 
This leader-follower game structure leads to an empirical health production function for 
the child’s obesity-related health outcome. 
 
4.1. Empirical Health Production Function 
4.1.1. The two specifications for the health production function 
The Stackleberg game presented in the theoretical chapter has the following stage 
structure:  
1. Stage 1: The two parents are acting as the Stackleberg leader and they 
maximize their collective utility function for any given decision choice of 
the child. In other words, the parents make their decision choices while 
considering the response consequences from the child; 
2. Stage 2: The child observes the parental decisions, then the child makes 
his/her own choices. Because of no uncertainty in this game, the child’s 
decisions take into account the parental choices. 
This specific stage structure leads to two specifications for the child’s obesity-related 
health production function, H. 
  
61
In the second stage of the game, the child (the Stackleberg follower) makes 
decisions on his/her own food choice and time allocations taking the parental decisions 
as exogenous.24 The optimal choice set is ),,( *** Eff ttx . So the child’s optimal choices 
are functions of the parental decisions and the other exogenous variables:25 
),,,,,,,,,,,( MFPH
J
C
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f kkEETTTTTXX μ . So in this stage of the game, the child’s 
obesity-related health production function is: 
(4.1) ),,;,( *** MFE kktNHH μ=  
     ),,,,,,,,,,,( MFPH
J
C
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f kkEETTTTTXXH μ= .26 
In the first stage of the game, the parents (the Stackleberg leader) make their 
decisions based on their own market goods consumption, food choices and their time 
allocations based on the “distribution of power” in order to achieve Pareto efficient 
resource allocation between them. Their optimal choice set is 
),,,,,,,,,( ********** Mw
F
w
M
f
F
f
J
C
M
C
F
C
F
o
M
f
F
f TTTTTTTXXX . Because they are able to act before 
the child, the parents can form their best responses to any given set of the child’s optimal 
decisions. So the parents’ optimal choices are functions of the exogenous variables: 
),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMF kkEEEIIww μ . In this stage of the game, the child’s obesity-
related health production function is: 
(4.2) ),,;,( ****** MFE kktNHH μ=  
                                                 
24 This is because of the no uncertainty assumption. 
25 The child’s optimal choices are functions of those parental decisions that enter into the child’s health 
production function indirectly through nutrition production function and those enter the child’s utility 
function directly. 
26 The double asterisks denote that these are the results after substituting the parental optimal decisions 
back into the child’s optimal choices. 
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                    ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMF kkEEEIIwwH μ= . 
 
4.1.2. Choosing the specification for the empirical estimation 
The two equations above (equation (4.1) and equation (4.2)) are specifications for 
the child’s obesity-related health production function. Equation (4.2) is the reduced form 
equation derived from this two-stage game because its right hand side arguments are all 
the exogenous variables that are predetermined in both stages of the game. However, it 
does not provide us with the information needed to explore how the parental decision 
variables influence the child’s obesity-related health outcome. Because equation (4.2) 
does not have the parental decision variables as its arguments, it is hard to disentangle 
the partial effects of the parental decisions on the child’s health outcome. 
Equation (4.1) is a reduced form equation from the child’s point of view (a reduced 
form derived in the second stage of the game). The right hand side variables of equation 
(4.1) are the parental decision variables and other exogenous variables. Because the 
child is the second mover, the parental decisions (the first mover’s actions) are given to 
the child. So from the child’s point of view, all the right hand side arguments of equation 
(4.1) are predetermined, which defines a reduced form equation. 
Meanwhile, equation (4.1) is qualified as a structural equation from the parents’ 
point of view (a structural equation illustrating the relationship between variables based 
on the theory in the first stage of the game). It serves as the starting point of the parents’ 
optimization problem. 
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As Rosenzweig and Schultz point out, the reduced form health equation (e.g., 
equation (4.2)) does not provide information on underlying household health technology. 
They also mention that the reduced form input demand functions possess identical 
properties to those derived from models without any household production embodied.27 
Equation (4.1), a structural equation in the parents’ stage of the game, preserves the 
relationship between parental choices and the child’s obesity-related health outcome, 
which is the focus of our study. So we choose to use equation (4.1) as the function to be 
specified for empirically estimating the child’s obesity-related health production 
function and exploring the partial effects of parental decisions.  
 
4.2. Empirical Model 
4.2.1. Single equation or a system 
Estimating equation (4.1) alone without recognizing the endogeneity problem will 
bring about biased estimates. Rosenzweig and Schultz point out that, for the general 
health production problem, the health technology estimation should take into account 
health inputs’ self-selection issues. The OLS estimates of equation (4.1) will be 
contaminated by heterogeneity bias due to self-selected health inputs (those parental 
choice variables). They also suggest that this type of estimation must be obtained from a 
behavioral model that treats health inputs as choice variables, which we have done in the 
previous theoretical chapter. 
                                                 
27 For example, the optimal solution functions for those parental decision variables that enter the health 
production function are actually reduced form health input demand functions. 
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In our case, the parental choice variables that enter the right hand side of equation 
(4.1) may bring correlations between health inputs and the health outcome. The 
theoretical model presented in the previous chapter provides a behavior model that treats 
those health inputs as parents’ own choices. As discussed in the above section, equation 
(4.1) is a structural equation from the parents’ point of view. In the parents’ stage of the 
game, the parental decision variables have the optimal solutions, 
),,,,,,,,,( ********** Mw
F
w
M
f
F
f
J
C
M
C
F
C
F
o
M
f
F
f TTTTTTTXXX , and they are functions of all the 
exogenous variables, ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMF kkEEEIIww μ . So there are also several 
reduced form equations in this stage of the games (the optimal parental choices 
equations) that are reduced form health input demands. 
We can estimate equation (4.1) by utilizing the arguments in those reduced form 
optimal parental choice functions as instruments. In the first stage, the parental choice 
functions are estimated for those parental decision variables that are in the right hand 
side of equation (4.1). Then the estimated parental choices are employed in a second 
stage to estimate the child’s obesity-related health production function (equation (4.1)). 
This two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation will provide us consistent estimators. 
However, the 2SLS estimation, although achieving consistency, is not efficient in 
the sense that it ignores the reduced-form restrictions implied by the theoretical model 
(Court; Rosenzweig and Schultz). A potential and achievable efficiency can be gained if 
we put the structural equations of interest together with any number of reduced form 
equations and estimate all of them jointly as a system (Court; Rosenzweig and Schultz). 
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We can estimate a system by putting the child’s obesity-related health production 
function (equation (4.1), the structural equation of interest) together with the reduced 
form parental optimal choice equations and estimate them simultaneously in order to 
achieve both consistency and efficiency. According to the specific structure of this 
system, it is qualified as a general triangular system and will be discussed further in 
section 4.3.2. Also, available data points and the degree of freedom problem are 
common among cross-sectional data sets, and is the case with our collected data set as 
well.28 By estimating an empirical system instead of a single empirical equation, we also 
gain the degree of freedom by increasing the number of available data points. For 
example, if a data set has n available data points and an empirical system utilizing this 
data set includes m equations, then the total number of observations available for this 
empirical system estimation should be equal to mn ∗ . 
 
4.2.2. Empirical system modification due to data limitation 
If an empirical system is constructed as discussed above, the system will be: 
(4.3a) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFF
f
F
f kkEEEIIwwXX μ=  
(4.3b) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFM
f
M
f kkEEEIIwwXX μ=  
(4.3c) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFF
f
F
f kkEEEIIwwTT μ=  
(4.3d) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFM
f
M
f kkEEEIIwwTT μ=  
(4.3e) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFF
C
F
C kkEEEIIwwTT μ=  
                                                 
28 Details will be discussed in the later chapters. 
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(4.3f) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFM
C
M
C kkEEEIIwwTT μ=  
(4.3g) ),,,,,,,,,( MFWPH
MFMFJ
C
J
C kkEEEIIwwTT μ=  
(4.1) ),,,,,,,,,,,( MFPH
J
C
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
f
M
f
F
f kkEETTTTTXXHH μ= . 
Equation (4.3a) to equation (4.3g) are the reduced form health input demand equations 
and equation (4.1) is the structural health production equation of interest. 
However, before discussing the identification issue of this empirical system, we 
need to verify that the data needs of this empirical system match our collected household 
survey data set.29 
First, in the survey data we collected, both parents were asked to provide 
information on the household’s expenditure patterns. They were not only asked about the 
monthly expenditures in a variety of different categories, but also who is in charge of 
making the monthly expenditure in each of the expenditure categories. Among those 
expenditure categories, there are three categories qualified as the household’s 
expenditure on food. However, the data set does not provide information on the parent’s 
individual expenditure choices. So the parent’s individual food expenditure choices, 
),( Mf
F
f XX , must be modified to accommodate this data limitation. In our empirical 
system, they will be replaced with the household’s food expenditure, fX .
30 As a result, 
only the partial effect of the household’s food expenditure can be analyzed and the two 
                                                 
29 The data collection details and the data contents and properties will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
30 Detailed generation process will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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reduced form demand functions for ),( Mf
F
f XX  are summed together to get the reduced 
form demand function for fX . 
Second, the data set we collected has detailed time use data. Both parents were 
asked to individually keep track of all of their activities during a 48-hour period using a 
designed time diary form. The details will be discussed in the following chapters. The 
time diary data we collected has a high response rate. In our sample, there were only 
four fathers and eight mothers who completed only one day of the time diary, all others 
provided complete two-day records. However, we still do not have satisfactory 
information required to identify the parents’ joint time spent with the child. Although the 
parents were asked to provide the information on who is with them during a given 
activity, the response rate on this specific information is low and of low quality. 
Including parental joint time with the child variable will further decrease the available 
data points. So in the empirical system, the parental time with the child, ),( MC
F
C TT , 
includes the parental joint time spent with the child, JCT . 
Third, in the survey, both parents were asked to provide information about their 
sources of earned income such as wages, salaries, commissions, etc., and their work 
schedule as well as sources of unearned income such as investment incomes, rental 
income, interest, etc. However, these income source data do not meet our data needs for 
the empirical system. The earned income sources the parents provided are monthly, 
while the working hours provided are weekly amounts which corresponds only to the 
week previous to the survey period. Among the parents surveyed, there are part-time 
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employees who may be on and off work during that year. So, in the empirical system, we 
assume that the time allocated to work, ),( Mw
F
w TT , has been predetermined and remains 
constant in the short run (Amuwo et al.). This can be a reasonable assumption for cross-
sectional data which covers a short period of time. 
 Based on the above modifications, the budget constraint for the parents will 
change from equation (3.8) to: 
(4.4) MFiYXX i
i
f
i
i
o ,==+ ∑∑ , 
where iY  is the individual parent’s total income (the individual earned income plus the 
individual unearned income). The two parental time constraints will change from 
equation (3.9) and (3.10) to: 
(4.5) FFw
F
o
F
f
F
C TTTTTT =−=++ ,  
(4.6) MMw
M
o
M
f
M
C TTTTTT =−=++ , 
where iT , i = F, M, is the non-work time available to the individual parent and the 
residual time left after devoting time to market work. Parental time spent with the child, 
),( MC
F
C TT , now includes their individual time spent with the child and the joint time 
spent with the child. 
The modified empirical system allowing for data limitations becomes: 
(4.7a) ),,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MF
ff TTkkEEEYYXX μ=  
(4.7b) ),,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MFF
f
F
f TTkkEEEYYTT μ=  
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(4.7c) ),,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MFM
f
M
f TTkkEEEYYTT μ=  
(4.7d) ),,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MFF
C
F
C TTkkEEEYYTT μ=  
(4.7e) ),,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MFM
C
M
C TTkkEEEYYTT μ=  
(4.1’) ),,,,,,,,,( MFPH
M
C
F
C
M
f
F
ff kkEETTTTXHH μ= . 
 
4.3. Identification and Estimation Strategies 
4.3.1. Simple linear specification and identification 
For simplicity, we start with a simple linear function specification for the above 
empirical system. This linear specification of the system is: 
(4.7a’) MFWPH
MF
f kakaaEaEaEaYaYaaX 181716151413121110 ++++++++= μ  
      111019 ε+++ MF TaTa  
(4.7b’) MFWPH
MFF
f kakaaEaEaEaYaYaaT 282726252423222120 ++++++++= μ  
      221029 ε+++ MF TaTa  
(4.7c’) MFWPH
MFM
f kakaaEaEaEaYaYaaT 383736353433323130 ++++++++= μ  
      331039 ε+++ MF TaTa  
(4.7d’) MFWPH
MFF
C kakaaEaEaEaYaYaaT 484746454443424140 ++++++++= μ  
      441049 ε+++ MF TaTa  
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(4.7e’) MFWPH
MFM
C kakaaEaEaEaYaYaaT 585756555453525150 ++++++++= μ  
      551059 ε+++ MF TaTa  
(4.1’’) μ987654321 bEbEbTbTbTbTbXbbH PHMCFCMfFff ++++++++=  
61110 ε+++ MF kbkb . 
As shown above, this empirical system consists of six equations with five reduced 
form equations (equation (4.7a’) to equation (4.7e’)) and one structural equation 
(equation (4.1’’)). Equation (4.7a’) to equation (4.7e’) are already identified by their 
reduced form properties. The identification issue of this empirical system now rests on 
the identification of equation (4.1’’). 
The order condition for identification of an equation j is stated as: “The number of 
exogenous variables excluded from equation j must be at least as large as the number of 
endogenous variables included in equation j” (Greene, pp.392). As Greene points out, in 
general, a model that passes the order condition will meet the rank condition also. So 
here we only check the order condition. 
The exogenous variables that are excluded from equation (4.1’’) are, 
),,,,( W
MFMF ETTYY . So the number of the exogenous variables that are excluded from 
equation (4.1’) is five. The endogenous variables that are in equation (4.1’’) are, 
),,,,( MC
F
C
M
f
F
ff TTTTX , which gives us five included endogenous variables. This means 
that equation (4.1’’) is exactly identified if all the variables are scalars. There is only one 
variable among them has the possibility of being defined as a vector in the later data 
specification. This variable is the work environment variable, EW, which may include the 
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work flexibility variable and the work commitment variable. The details will be 
discussed in the data specification chapter. If the work environment is a vector, equation 
(4.1’’) is then over-identified. 
 
4.3.2. Triangular system and estimation strategies 
The empirical system presented in the above section consists of six equations. The 
last equation, equation (4.1’’), contains the other five equations’ endogenous variables 
and those five equations do not have any endogenous variables as their right hand side 
arguments. If we organize the system by putting the endogenous variables all to the left 
hand side of the equations, the system can be presented in the following matrix form: 
(4.8) UCXBY += . 
Y is a vector of all the endogenous variables: ],,,,,[' HTTTTXY MC
F
C
M
f
F
ff= . Its 
associated coefficient matrix B is of the form: 
 
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
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⎢⎢
⎢⎢
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⎣
⎡
−
−
−
−
−
=
100000
10000
01000
00100
00010
00001
6
5
4
3
2
b
b
b
b
b
B . 
It is clear that the coefficient matrix B is a special case of an upper triangular matrix. So 
this empirical system is called the triangular system (Greene; Kmenta). X is an 111×  
vector of all the exogenous variables plus one for the intercept term: 
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],,,,,,,,,,1[' MFMFWPH
MF TTkkEEEYYX μ=  and its associated coefficient matrix C is a 
116×  matrix. The disturbance vector U is of dimension: 16× . 
Denote the covariance matrix of the disturbance, U, to be:  
Σ=)|'( XUUE . 
If the disturbances in the system are uncorrelated, Σ is diagonal, and the system is a fully 
recursive system (Greene, pp. 397). This recursive system is a special case of the 
triangular system. It is well known that the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are 
consistent for the fully recursive system. This means that if the empirical system is a 
fully recursive system, we can consistently estimate the system using equation-by-
equation OLS. 
However, it is clear that the disturbance term in the structural health outcome 
equation (equation (4.1’)) may be correlated with the other five disturbances through the 
endogenous variables that are in the right hand side of equation (4.1’). So our empirical 
system is a general triangular system with non-diagonal disturbance covariance matrix, Σ.  
Generally, OLS estimates bring about a simultaneous equation bias which can be 
corrected by using three-stage least square (3SLS). 
Lahiri and Schmidt suggest that the general triangular system can be estimated 
consistently and efficiently using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method. 
Meanwhile, they point out that only if the covariance matrix, Σ, is known, will efficiency 
be gained simply by using SUR method. Since it is almost never the case in practice that 
the covariance matrix, Σ, is known, using SUR is not recommended.  
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Lahiri and Schmidt suggest using the iterated SUR to achieve the algebraically 
same results as the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator. However as 
Prucha points out, the covariance matrix from the iterated SUR is not consistent. A 
consistent estimator of the covariance matrix can be obtained by using the parameter 
estimates from the iterated SUR as starting values for a FIML routine and taking the 
standard errors from the routine. 
It is well known that when the covariance matrix, Σ, is unknown, the FIML and 
3SLS are equally efficient. We choose to use the iterated 3SLS (IT3SLS) as the 
procedure for our triangular system estimation. However, as is common in cross-
sectional analysis, the instruments we have may be weak. As Park and Davis show, 
when instruments are weak, the instrumental variable (IV) estimators exhibit poor and 
misleading asymptotic properties. In our empirical estimation, both the iterated seeming 
unrelated regression (ITSUR) and IT3SLS results will be presented and the robustness 
across both estimators will be examined. We use ITSUR to compare with IT3SLS 
instead of individual OLS results because we have developed the triangular system from 
our theoretical framework which minimizes the potential equation misspecification. By 
utilizing the theory-based empirical system running ITSUR instead of OLS, we will be 
able to gain efficiency without contaminating the whole system with misspecification. 
 
4.4. Chapter Summary 
According to the theoretical model presented in the previous chapter, two 
specifications are derived for the child’s obesity-related health production function. The 
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specification with parental decision variables as its arguments is selected as our 
empirical specification. The specific stage of the theoretical game structure also provides 
us with several reduced form health input demand functions. The child’s health 
production function is combined with the reduced form demand functions (the parental 
choice equations) to construct an empirical system in order to gain consistency and 
efficiency. 
This constructed empirical system is modified to accommodate our data limitations, 
but the modification does not distract us from the focus of this study. The partial effects 
of parental time allocation on the child’s obesity-related health outcome can still be 
explored. 
We start with simple linear specifications for the empirical system and examine the 
identification issue. Our empirical system is a general triangular system with cross-
equation correlations considered. The IT3SLS is chosen as our estimation procedure to 
obtain consistent and efficient results. As it is common in cross-sectional analysis that 
the instruments are likely to be weak, we will present both ITSUR and IT3SLS results to 
access robustness across these estimators. 
The following chapter will provide a detailed description of our data set collection, 
including the sampling process and survey instruments. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This study utilizes a data set collected through a multi-disciplinary project at Texas 
A&M University entitled “Parental Time, Role Strains, Coping, and Children’s Diet and 
Nutrition”. The data set not only covers sociological aspects of the family, financial 
structure information and demographic details, but also provides dietary intake details 
and two-consecutive-day time diary records. Another unique aspect of this data set is 
that the above detailed information is available for each participating member of the 
household (two parents and one child).31 
 
5.1. Data Collection and Survey Instruments 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, a desirable data set for exploring the 
impacts of the parental time allocation and other parental factors on the children’s health 
outcomes and the potential differences between fathers and mothers’ marginal effects 
should not only include children’s health status and nutrient intake but also have detailed 
parental time diary records on individual levels. Unfortunately, no existing data set has 
the required degree of richness to directly associate all these variables at the individual 
level.32  
 
 
                                                 
31 This is for the two-parent household case. In our data set, we also have some single mother samples. 
32 This section is based on the project report titled “Parental Time, Role Strain, and Children’s Fat Intake 
and Obesity Related Outcomes.” This report is submitted to the Economic Research Service, USDA. 
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5.1.1. Data collection overview 
The data set used in this study was collected between July 2001 and June 2002. 
The data were drawn from over 300 households in Houston (MSA), Texas. The sample 
was generated through random digital dialing. The goal was to obtain data from one 
child and both of that child’s parents in dual-headed households or from one child and 
that child’s mother in single female-headed households. The survey only covered 
children of age 9 to 11 or 13 to 15. Obtaining detailed data from children under the age 
of 9 using complex survey instruments is problematic (Crocket and Peterson). 
Furthermore, the nutrition literature suggests excluding 12-year olds because this is the 
age at which many children undergo puberty, which can greatly influence their diet 
intake and outcome measures. Crocket and Peterson also point out that as children 
progress through adolescence, the parental influence will begin to wane. So the data set 
contains these two age-groups in order to explore the waning parental influence on 
children’s diets and health outcomes as they get older. 
 
5.1.2. Survey instruments 
Details of the data collection and instruments can be found in the project report 
(McIntosh et al.). The data set has individual information on two parents and one child 
for each household. Six survey instruments, grouped under three general headings, were 
used in the collection of the data. 
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1. Parent’s telephone interview.33 Each parent was interviewed by phone using a 
standard set of questions to determine their employment status, work type and work 
schedule. The interview questionnaire also includes work environment assessment 
questions to measure work flexibility, work control, and work commitment and the 
work-home role conflict for measuring work-to-home spillover. This interview also 
covers parenting styles (e.g., parental food control, parental feeding styles), parental 
concern about children’s eating habits, and parent’s self-reported health status along 
with the standard family socio-demographics. 
2. Parent’s self-administered questionnaire with time diary.34 The questionnaire 
was designed to obtain both sociological and economic information from each parent. 
For the sociological information, each parent was asked his/her parenting strategies. 
With regard to the economic aspects, information about the individual parental sources 
of income and the household’s expenditure patterns was gathered.35 Also, parental time 
allocation pattern data over two consecutive days were gathered through time diaries.  
3. Children’s questionnaire, 24-hour dietary recall, 24-hour activity record, 
physical exam, 2-day diet record, 2-day activity record. The child interview consisted of 
three parts.36 First, the interviewer went through the questionnaire with the child to 
complete the questions pertaining to the child’s perception of his/her parents’ parenting 
style, his/her relationship with his/her parents, family meal practice, the child’s self-
                                                 
33 Each parent was interviewed over the phone separate from their spouse and the interview lasted about 
45 minutes. 
34 The field interviewers went through the questionnaire and time diary with the parents at their home and 
the instruments were left with them to be mailed back after completion. 
35 The data set does not have information on the individual expenditure. 
36 The interview time ranged from 45 minutes to 1 hour and 45 minutes. In rare cases, the interview took 
place in public facility or private home chosen by the parents. 
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esteem, personal health habits (e.g., dietary behavior and exercising frequency), work for 
pay experience and socio-demographic background.  
Second, the children participated in a 24-hour dietary recall and a 24-hour activity 
recall under the guidance of the interviewers. The children were then instructed to be 
able to maintain a two-day diet record and a two-day activity record. The food record 
data were transformed into the child’s nutrient intake values through the Food Processor. 
Lastly, the field interviewers took the child’s anthropometric measurements.37 The 
child then completed the Tanner scales in order to obtain an indication of their pubertal 
status.38 The child was given an envelope with the Tanner drawings and instructed to go 
into another room, circle the drawing that most closely resembled their body type, and 
return the Tanner drawings in the sealed envelope to the interviewer. 
Details on survey respondent incentives and compensation plans can be found in 
the project report. 
 
5.2. Data Specification 
Chapter IV presents the empirical system for our estimation. In this general 
triangular system, we utilize the collected data set to specify sixteen variables: 
),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,( MFMFWPH
MFM
C
F
C
M
f
F
ff TTkkEEEYYHTTTTX μ . Among these sixteen 
variables are six endogenous variables and ten exogenous variables indicated by the 
theory. 
                                                 
37 The anthropometric measures include sub-scapular and triceps skinfold thicknesses, waist and hip 
circumference, height, weight. 
38 Tanner scale is used to determine the growth and sexual development of the child interviewed. Please 
refer to the project report by McIntosh et al. for detailed discussion on this. 
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Table 1 reports detailed descriptions of variables used in the empirical analysis 
including variable names, definition descriptions, and units. The table presentation 
breaks the variables down into dependent and independent variables. The empirical 
analysis explores the system in two ways: (a) estimate the system using the whole 
sample which pools both age groups (9-11 year old children and 13-15 year old children) 
together and adds one dummy variable, “Age”, to examine the age effect; (b) break the 
whole sample down into two subsets by the two age groups to examine the separate 
parental effects on each group.  
 
5.2.1. Household expenditure and individual total income 
As mentioned before, our collected data set does not have individual parent’s 
expenditure information. The empirical model is modified according to this limitation to 
include only the household food expenditure, fX . During the interview, both parents 
were asked individually to provide monthly dollar amounts spent by the household on 
several expenditure categories. Among those categories, we find three food-related 
categories: (a) money spent on groceries and other food items eaten at home; (b) money 
spent on take-out and food delivered eaten at home; (c) money spent on going out to eat. 
In addition to dollar amount information, both parents were asked whether they were 
usually in charge of making the purchase in this expenditure category. 
The household expenditure amount for food, fX , is generated from this 
information. For each of the three food-related expenditure categories, we have 
information provided by each parent. If only one of the parents indicates that he/she is 
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the one who usually makes decisions on the purchase and he/she provides non-missing 
data on the dollar amount, then this dollar amount is treated as the household monthly 
expenditure on this food-related category. If both parents say yes or both say no to the 
question on whether he/she is in charge of making purchase decisions, then the 
household expenditure amount in this category is the average of the expenditure amounts 
reported by both. The total household food expenditure will be the sum of the three 
expenditures on the three food-related categories. 
Also, due to the data limitation discussed before, the empirical model treats the 
market working hours as predetermined and includes only the individual total income 
rather than wage rates and unearned incomes. Each parent’s total income, ( MF YY , ), is 
the reported individual total income dollar amount or the sum of earned income and 
unearned income. 
 
5.2.2. The child’s obesity-related health indicator 
The effect of parental time allocations on the child’s obesity-related health 
outcome, H, is the focus of this study. “The degree of obesity is best defined by the body 
mass index (BMI, weight in kg/(height in m)2” (Hoffman and Sawaya, pp.657). In 
general, a person is considered to be unhealthy (overweight) when the BMI score is 
greater than 25 and is defined as obese if the BMI score exceeds 30. Unlike adults, 
however, where overweight or obesity is based on a defined BMI score, childhood 
overweight is identified by one's BMI in relation to age and gender (Cole et al.).  
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For this study, we use a continuous BMI score as the indicator for the child’s 
obesity-related health outcome, H. BMI scores were calculated from the child’s weight 
and height anthropometric measurements according to the BMI definition. 
 
5.2.3. Parental time measurements 
There are two parental time allocation variables that enter the child’s obesity-
related health production function, the parental time spent in food preparation, ),( Mf
F
f TT , 
and the parental time spent with the child, ),( MC
F
C TT . These variables were generated 
from the two-consecutive-day time diary records provided by both parents and are in 
minute units. 
Parental time spent in food preparation includes not only the time spent in 
preparing meals, drinks and snacks, but also the time spent in food clean-up and take-out 
food purchasing. The two-day time diary records also give us information on time spent 
in grocery shopping and meal/shopping list planning, but we do not include this time in 
the food preparation time variable since the time information in the data set is limited to 
the two-day window. A household may or may not go shopping during the survey period, 
thus, including grocery shopping and meal/shopping list planning time would lead to a 
large variance in the time spent in food preparation.  
Another time allocation variable is the parental time spent with the child. We will 
mainly explore its influence on the child’s obesity-related health outcome and the 
different impacts of the father’s time and the mother’s time. This time variable 
represents the average time per day the mother and father each spend with the child. This 
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variable is derived by subtracting the total of all parental time not spent with the child 
from the total available time in a day (1440 minutes). 
It should be mentioned that this measure does not distinguish between the time 
spent in activities that contribute to energy intake (e.g., consuming food) and those that 
qualify as energy expenditure (e.g., exercising). Although this measure does capture the 
general quantity of parental time spent with the child, it cannot fully depict the quality of 
the time. The quality of the time is the quality of interaction between parents and the 
child during their time together and the parents’ degree of engagement.  
The last parental time variable is the total non-working time available to each 
parent, ),( MF TT . This variable is residual time and is equal to the total time per day 
(1440 minutes) minus parental time spent in market work per day. 
All these parental time allocation variables are averaged from the two-day records 
using primary activities as the criteria. Because our empirical model has work 
environment, EW, as an exogenous variable, our sample is a subset of the entire project 
data set and covers only those households with two working parents. In our sample, the 
two-consecutive-day survey period varies across individual households and both 
weekday and weekend time allocation data are mixed in the sample. The household 
could be interviewed during two weekdays, or over a weekend, or possibly one weekday 
(Friday) and one weekend day (Saturday). There is an indicator in the data set to 
distinguish between weekday and weekend time devotion.  
However, weekday and weekend time distinction is not an issue of major concern 
since parental time devotion choices are expected to have different patterns as the total 
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available non-working time changes. The real issue is working day versus non-working 
day. In our sample, there are working parents who work full-time, part-time or other 
scheduled working times, so the weekend does not necessarily correspond to non-
working day for all parents in the data set. 
This issue brings out an important point: there are potential differences in working 
day and non-working day parental time allocation decisions. In order to explore them, 
we create two dummy variables, (Df, Dm), for the father and the mother to identify 
working days and non-working days. The dummy variable equals 1 when the two-day 
time diary survey period covers at least one working-day (the reported working time is 
nonzero for at least one day) and 0 if both days are non-working days.39 These two 
dummies will be added along with the total non-working time variables to all five 
reduced-form health input demand equations. 
The generated time allocation variables should represent working day time 
devotion patterns when at least one working day time allocation is reported during the 
survey period. They should capture non-working day time devotion patterns when the 
two days are both non-working days. A discussion of how those variables are generated 
follows. 
The average working time variable, Tw, is generated by utilizing an indicator in the 
data set which comes from a question in the telephone interview part of the survey. The 
parent was asked the following question: “What days of the week do you normally 
work?” If the parent answers that his/her work schedule is Monday through Friday or 
                                                 
39 The detailed summary statistics will be presented later. 
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Monday through Friday plus some weekends, we created an indicator, i, to denote that 
the parent works at least five weekdays. Among the total working parents sample we 
collected, 84% of the fathers in the sample and 71% of the mothers in the sample worked 
at least five days a week.40 If the parent did not provide an answer but he/she was 
employed at that time, the assumption is that he/she works weekdays.41 Among the 237 
working fathers in the telephone interview data, there are only 4 records have missing 
values on this question or only 1.7% of the sample. Among the 211 working mothers in 
the sample, there is only 1 record has missing value on this question. 
The average working time per day is generated as follows: 
• For those reporting non-missing (including zero value) working time for two 
days and those two days are one weekday and one weekend day, the mean of 
the two days is taken as the average working time if both days have nonzero 
values; if one of them has nonzero working time and the other has zero 
working time, then the nonzero value is used as the average working time; if 
both reported values are zero, the average working time will be zero meaning 
that the two days that the parent was interviewed were non-working days.42 
• If the two days are both weekdays, then the indicator, i, will be used to identify 
whether those two days should be work days or not. If the answer is yes, then 
the mean will be used as the average working time. If the indicator shows that 
                                                 
40 Working fathers and working mothers are the ones who reported worked nonzero hours during the week 
before the interview period.  
41 The sample size of this study is small and the degree of freedom is of concern. So we try to preserve as 
many data points as possible. 
42 In the working parents subset of the data set, there are 13 fathers and 25 mothers who reported zero 
working time in both two days. The detailed summary statistics for the empirical data set used in the 
analysis will be discussed later. 
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the person does not work regularly during weekdays, we treat the average 
working time as missing.43  
So the total available non-working time, ),( MF TT , is the result of subtracting generated 
working-time from the total amount of time in a day. 
The other two parental time allocation variables are generated in the same fashion. 
If the two days have nonzero working time values and cover weekday and weekend, then 
the average of the two time allocation categories (parental time spent with the child, and 
the parental time spent in food preparation) will be used as variable values. For those 
have only one nonzero working time value, only the time allocation patterns on that day 
are counted as variable values. So generated parental time allocation variable values will 
capture working-day patterns if the two-day survey period covers at least one working-
day and will represent non-working day patterns if the survey period covers two non-
working days for the parent. 
 
5.2.4. Other exogenous variables 
In the empirical model, there are several exogenous variables: environmental 
variables, the child’s type variables, and the parents’ type variables. 
The environmental variables cover three aspects: home, peers and parent’s work. 
These variables capture home and societal influences on the child’s obesity-related 
health outcome and the parental work stress and work commitment assessment. The 
                                                 
43 If the two days are all weekend days, then the mean will be assumed to be the average working time. 
The percentages are very low: among the whole data set, only 4 fathers and 5 mothers were interviewed 
only in weekends. 
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home environment, EH, is captured by a factor, created from the principal factors factor 
analysis.44 This factor is work-to-family spillover and depicts the home environment 
caused by work-related negative impacts such as no energy, no time for family and poor 
father/mother role performance. Devine et al. suggest that the mother’s work stress and 
work-to-family spillover may cause more family meal skipping, meal irregularity and 
more take-out food purchasing. A high score of work-to-family spillover indicates that 
the parent is more likely to experience work-to-family spillover (conflict between family 
and work roles caused by work demand). 
The child’s peer environment, EP, enters the model to depict peer pressure. In our 
survey, the children were asked whether or not they felt that others thought they were 
overweight. This question is used to generate the peer pressure dummy variable. The 
dummy variable is 1 if the child said yes (there existed peer pressure on the child’s self-
image), 0 otherwise. 
The parent’s work environment, EW, captures the market work direct influence on 
the parents’ utilities. This variable indirectly influences the child’s health outcome 
through optimal solutions. We use two variables to depict this aspect: work flexibility 
and work commitment of each parent.  
Work flexibility shows how flexible the parent’s work schedule can be (in hours 
and in days). Fenwick and Tausig demonstrate that such flexibility may increase 
satisfaction with work and with life in general, and improves health status. Several 
studies show that control over work schedule may have emotional and physical 
                                                 
44 Detailed factor analysis results can be found in the project report (McIntosh et al.). 
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consequences and may contribute to tensions in spouse relationships and parent-child 
interactions (Baker; Menaghan; Rau Triemer). We used two questions in the survey to 
capture the working hour flexibility and working day flexibility for both parents. Those 
variables are rank variables: they reflect inflexibility, some flexibility, and high 
flexibility. The value ranges from 1 to 3 or from inflexible to highly flexible. We directly 
use these ranks as indicators of work flexibility. 
Work commitment captures the importance parents place on their jobs relative to 
other roles in life. Laedwig and McGee found that work commitment is positively 
related to spouse conflict. In our survey, parents were asked whether work is the most 
important thing in their lives. They chose from strongly disagree, disagree, neither 
agree/disagree, agree, and strongly agree. The answer ranges from 1 to 5 indicating the 
parent’s commitment to work from very low to very high. We directly use these ranks to 
capture the degree of work commitment. 
The child’s type variable, μ, helps to capture the genetic and sociological aspects of 
the child. It is a vector of variables. We used the following variables to determine it: the 
child’s gender, the child’s puberty stage (if the value is 1 means that the child is post-
puberty; 0 means that the child is pre-puberty), the child’s ethnicity and the child’s 
activity level. The child’s activity level was generated from a question asking how many 
times in the past 14 days the child has done at least 30 minutes of hard exercise.45 The 
ranking variables (it has five ranks) are generated into four dummy variables with no 
exercise at all as the base. For the pooled model estimation combining both age groups, 
                                                 
45 The hard exercise refers to those exercises that can make the child breathe heavily and the heart beat fast, 
such as playing basketball, jogging etc. It includes physical education class activities.  
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one dummy variable is added to the child’s type variable to indicate the age group. The 
dummy variable is 1 if the child is 13 to 15, and 0 otherwise. 
The parent’s type variables, ),( MF kk , are used to depict the heredity of the child 
and the power difference between parents. The parent’s individual BMI scores act as 
heredity measures. To determine parental power differences, we use four dummies 
generated from four decision power related questions: who decides on whether to buy 
groceries; who decides on whether to eat out; who decides on how much to spend on 
groceries; who decides on how much to spend on eating out. We first create four rank 
variables as follows for the father and the mother, respectively: the value is 2 if the 
parent indicates that he/she is the only decision maker; the value is 1 if the parent 
indicates that he/she makes the majority of decisions; the value is 0 if the parent reports 
that he/she and other family members equally make decisions; the value is -1 if other 
family members make more decisions; the value is -2 if only other family members 
make decisions. Then the power difference dummies are created from the differences 
between the father’s answers and the mother’s answers. 
 
5.3. Summary Statistics 
This section reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample (Table 2) and 
the two separate samples, respectively (Table 3 and Table 4). The mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum and the coefficients of variation (CV) will be 
discussed. The CV represents an attribute of a distribution and is a statistical measure of 
the deviation of a variable from its mean. It is calculated by dividing the standard 
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deviation of the given variable by its mean and can be represented as a percentage: CV%. 
It is helpful in comparing the variation of populations that have different units, so it will 
be used to compare some of the variables across the two age-group subsamples. 
 
5.3.1 Summary statistics for the pooled model 
The entire data set collected through the project has a maximum of 325 household 
records and each household record has three sets of data: the father’s data, the mother’s 
data and the child’s data. There are numerous combinations of missing information 
within the data set since different combinations of questions were not answered by 
different household members. When the regression is run using the full data set, the 
household records that have missing data for the variables of interest are dropped out of 
the sample automatically. We report only the data set that is actually used in the analysis 
which includes all households that have complete information from both parents and the 
child for the variables of interest. The sample size will be the same for all variables 
within the same model. 
For the pooled model, we do not separate the sample into two age groups. Instead, 
one dummy variable46 is added into the system to identify the age effects. The summary 
statistics are reported in Table 2. The sample size for the pooled model analysis is 127 
observations. Out of the total 325 households, 127 households have complete 
information for all the variables in the empirical system. Because we have work-related 
                                                 
46 The dummy variable, Age, have value of 1 if the child is of age 13 to 15 and 0 otherwise. 
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variables in the empirical system, such as work environment and work to home spillover, 
the sample represents only households with two working parents47. 
The average total household monthly expenditure on food is about $688 with a 
huge variation: the minimum is $210 and the maximum is $1579. The fathers’ average 
total income is larger than the mothers’ average total income and also is of less 
variability compared to the mothers’. The CV of the fathers’ income is 68% while the 
CV of the mothers’ income is 104%. 
In the sample, mothers devote more time to the family compared to fathers on 
average. Mothers spend an average of about one hour a day in meal and drink 
preparation, meal clean up and purchasing fast food (65 minutes), while fathers spend an 
average of 21 minutes. The average daily amount of time mothers in the sample spend 
with their children is about one and a half hours (91 minutes) while fathers spend an 
average of one hour and eighteen minutes (78 minutes) a day. Fathers’ time spent with 
the child has a large range compared to mothers’ from 0 hours to 16 hours a day.  
It is a consistent pattern that fathers’ time devotion to the family (food preparation 
and time with the child) has larger variability. The CV of mothers’ food preparation time 
is 83% while the CV of fathers’ is 121%. The CVs of parental time spent with the child 
also show that fathers’ family time devotion has larger deviation compared to mothers’ 
(father: 143%, mother: 101%). Meanwhile, mothers have more available non-working 
time per day on average compared to fathers and with less variability. In the sample, 
                                                 
47 The whole data set includes single mother households, and one working parent households. 
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90% of the fathers and 80% of the mothers reported at least one working day time 
allocation pattern. 
The average score for the children’s BMI is about 21 with a minimum of 14 and a 
maximum of 45. Children’s BMI standard is different from that of adults. The children’s 
BMIs should be compared to the BMI-for-age charts (one for boys and one for girls) 
provided by The National Center for Health Statistics and the National Center for 
Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion. Each chart contains a series of 
curved lines indicating specific percentiles. The child is considered to be “at risk of 
overweight” if the BMI-for-age is between the 85th percentile and the 95th percentile; if it 
is at or above the 95th percentile, the child is “overweight”. After age 20, the BMI cut-off 
points for “at-risk for overweight” and “overweight” are the same as for adults. The 
children’s BMI cut-off points vary according to the children’s gender and age. So the 
children’s BMI mean does not have clear cut-off points to compare. Fathers have higher 
average BMIs than mothers (27 vs. 25). However, both means belong to the 
“overweight” category (25≤BMI<30). Mothers have more variability in BMI than 
fathers. 
Most of the sociological variables indicate only ordinal changes in the given 
variables. Work-to-home spillover is a factor generated from the principal factors factor 
analysis and the unit is difficult to interpret. The higher the spillover score, the more 
likely the person is experiencing more work-to-home spillover. Work flexibility and 
work commitment variables are rank variables and hard to compare and interpret from 
summary.  
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In our sample, 10% of the children are experiencing a certain degree of peer 
pressure on their self-esteem, 48% are boys, 55% of the children belong to the 13 to 15 
age group, 80% of the children are non-Hispanic white, 11% are Hispanic, 88% of the 
children are pubescent, and 95% of the children have at least one day of active exercise 
in the past 14 days. 
 
5.3.2. Summary statistics for two subsamples  
We expect parental influences to have different effects on children as compared to 
adolescents. Therefore, it is logical to separate children of age 9 to 11 and children of 
age 13 to 15 to explore the potential differences. After splitting the sample, 57 
households have children aged 9 to 11 and 70 households have children aged 13 to 15. 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the summary statistics for these two age groups, respectively. 
The average monthly household food expenditure amount is of the same variability 
across the two subsamples with the average of $676 in the younger children sample and 
$697 in the older children sample. All fathers have higher average total income than 
mothers in both subsamples. Parents with younger children have a higher deviation in 
total income compared to those with older children and fathers have less variability in 
their total income compared to mothers in both samples. In the younger children sample, 
the CV of fathers’ income is 73% and the CV of mothers’ income is 112%; for the older 
children sample, fathers’ income CV is 63% and mothers’ income CV is 100%. 
On average, parents with older children spend relatively more time in food 
preparation compared to those who have younger children. The difference is larger in 
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father’s food preparation time devotion: fathers with older children devote an average of 
25 minutes a day in food preparation while fathers with younger children devote an 
average of 16 minutes a day. Also, there is less variability in father’s food preparation 
time allocation and more variability in mother’s food allocation time devotion in the 
older children sample compared to the younger children sample. Parents spend more 
time with their children in the younger group on average. In the younger children sample, 
fathers spend an average of one hour and twenty-three minutes per day (83 minutes) 
with their children while mothers spend around two hours per day (113 minutes) with 
their children; in the older children sample, fathers spend about one hour and fifteen 
minutes per day (75 minutes) on average with their children and mothers spend about 
one hour and thirteen minutes (73 minutes). There is more variability in parents’ time 
spent with children in the older children sample compared to the younger children 
sample. Mothers spend more time with their children compared to fathers when their 
children are of age 9 to 11.  Fathers spend relatively more time with their children 
compared to mothers on average when the children are of age 13 to 15. Meanwhile, the 
parents all have more non-working time available for the family on average in the 
younger children sample compared to the older children sample. The percentages of 
parents reporting at least one working day are almost the same across the two 
subsamples. 
The children’s BMI scores in both subsamples have similar variability (20% CV in 
the younger children sample, 22% CV in the older children sample). The younger 
children sample has a maximum BMI of 29 and the older children sample has a 
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maximum BMI of 45. These two maximum scores well exceed the 95th percentile BMI-
for-age cut-off points for both boys and girls.48 The parents’ BMI scores have similar 
means across the two subsamples with the older children sample exhibiting higher 
variability in both parents BMI scores compared to the younger children sample. 
On average, both parents have more flexible work schedules (in terms of work-day 
and work-hour) when their children are of age 9 to 11 and experience less work-to-home 
spillover. Mothers put their work priority lower on average when their children are 
younger while fathers exhibit the opposite pattern. 
Both subsamples have similar percentages of children experiencing some degree of 
peer pressure on their self-esteem. There are 42% boys in the younger children sample 
and 53% boys in the older children sample. About 74% of the younger children in the 
sample are non-Hispanic white and 18% are Hispanic. About 84% of the older children 
in the sample are non-Hispanic white and only 6% are Hispanic. The percentages of the 
children who participate in active exercise at least one day in the past 14 days are similar 
across the samples. 
 
5.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents detailed information on the data set used in the empirical 
analysis. This unique data set covers several aspects of household dynamics: financial 
information, parenting styles, sociological factors, family meal practice, nutrient intake 
                                                 
48 According to the BMI-for-age charts developed by the National Center for Health Statistics, the 95th 
percentile for boys of age 11 is 23.2 and girls of age 11 is 24.1, the 95th percentile for boys of age 15 is 
26.8 while for girls is 28.1. 
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patterns, parental time allocation information and children’s time allocation information, 
along with the socio-demographics. This complex data information covers individual 
household members and provides us with individual-level parental information and child 
health outcome data. This information makes it possible for our empirical analysis to 
explore parental influence and the potential differences between fathers and mothers. 
The data collection overview and six survey instruments are discussed. This section 
draws from the project report by McIntosh et al. 
In order to present estimation results clearly in the following chapter, the variable 
generation processes are discussed in this chapter. Sixteen variables of interests are 
defined using the information collected in the data set. The household monthly food 
expenditure amount is generated mainly by using the decision-maker’s reported amount. 
Individual income is the sum of wage income and non-wage income. The parental time 
allocation variables are generated in a specific way in order to capture the working-day 
time devotion pattern if the time diary data reflects information from at least one 
working day; otherwise the time allocation variables will depict the non-working day 
pattern. The children’s BMI and the parents’ individual BMI are calculated according to 
the BMI definition. There is one factor generated using factor analysis. The work 
environmental variables are all ranking variables which reflect ordinal changes. The 
other exogenous variables such as peer pressure, activity level, and parents’ decision 
power variables are discussed as well as the socio-demographics. 
Finally the summary statistics of the variables of interests are presented for the 
pooled model and the two separate age-group models. 
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The following chapter will present empirical estimation results for the children’s 
obesity-related health production function and the other five health input demand 
functions. The pooled model, the younger children (of age 9 to 11) model and the older 
children (of age 13 to 15) model will all be included, and the IT3SLS and ITSUR 
estimators will be compared to examine robustness. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The previous chapter reported data descriptions and summary statistics for those 
variables used in the empirical analysis. The empirical chapter (Chapter IV) derived a 
general triangular system with five reduced-form health input demand equations and one 
structural children’s health outcomes production equation.  
This chapter presents estimation results for the triangular system we developed 
using the data described in the previous chapter. Because the focus of our study is on 
parental influences on children’s obesity-related health outcomes, the empirical results 
for the child’s obesity-related health production function presented in the empirical setup 
chapter (Chapter IV) are the main results we will examine. The reduced form health 
input demand functions results will be discussed as well. The pooled model estimation 
results will be presented separately while the two subsamples’ estimation results will be 
compared. Also the IT3SLS and ITSUR results will be compared to examine robustness 
across alternative estimators. 
 
6.1. Obesity-Related Health Production Function Estimation Results 
The empirical setup chapter (Chapter IV) presented a triangular system used in this 
empirical analysis. In that general triangular system, there is only one structural equation 
which is the child’s obesity-related health production function: 
(4.1) ),,,,,,,,,( MFPH
M
C
F
C
M
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F
ff kkEETTTTXHH μ= . 
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The estimation results for this equation will provide the marginal effects of parental 
factors on the children’s health outcomes. We choose the semi-log (the left hand side 
variable, H, is in log form and the other variables remain unchanged) functional form for 
this production function and the linear functional form for all reduced form health input 
demand equations. The functional form selection should be considered for future study. 
There are three types of explanatory variables in the health production function that 
can be grouped as follows: 
1. Economic Variables: the household total monthly food expenditure, fX ; 
the parent’s time spent in food preparation (including meal clean up and 
fast food purchasing), ),( Mf
F
f TT ; the parent’s time spent with the child (not 
separating out the individual time and joint time), ),( MC
F
C TT . 
2. Sociological Variables: the parent’s work-to-home spillover factors which 
capture the home environment, EH ; the peer pressure the child is facing, EP. 
3. Control Variables: the child’s gender, ethnicity, age (only enter into the 
pooled model), activity level; the parent’s BMI scores, the decision power 
difference between the father and the mother, (D1, D2, D3, D4). 
The results will be presented in these categories. 
 
6.1.1. The Pooled Model 
The parameter estimation results and standard errors are reported in Table 5.  
Economic Variables: For these five economic variables, there exist large 
discrepancies across the alternative estimators. Four variables appear statistically 
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significant at the 5% significance level in the ITSUR results and none is significant in 
the IT3SLS results even at the 10% significance level. The magnitudes of the estimates 
are larger in ITSUR results than those in IT3SLS results except for the total household 
monthly food expenditure. All the signs are consistent across the two alternative 
estimators. In future work, the instruments will be tested more.  
Now let us take a look at the significant variables in the ITSUR estimation. The 
total household monthly food expenditure has positive impact on the children’s BMI 
outcome. A $1,000 increase in the household monthly food expenditure will lead to a 0.1 
log unit increase in the children’s BMI which is about a 1.3 unit increase in BMI score. 
Both fathers’ and mothers’ parental food preparation time are positively related to 
children’s obesity-related health outcomes. Every 100 minute increase in fathers’ food 
preparation time is associated with about a 0.3 log unit increase in the children’s BMI 
while the 100-minute increase in mothers’ food preparation time is associated with a 0.6 
log unit BMI increase in the children. The children’s BMI in log form tends to decrease 
when the parents spend more time with their children. The fathers’ time spent with their 
children has statistically significant impact: for every additional 100 minutes fathers 
spent with their children, their children’s BMI score decreases by around 1 unit. 
Sociological Variables: The estimation results exhibit consistency in signs, 
magnitudes and significance across the alternative estimators. The mothers’ work-to-
home spillover factor tends to be positively related to the children’s BMI outcomes.49 
Both IT3SLS and ITSUR estimators show that for every one unit increase in the 
                                                 
49 The significance level is 10%. 
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mothers’ work-to-home spillover, there will be a 0.05 log unit increase in the BMI score, 
or approximately a 1.1 unit BMI score increases. Also both estimates confirm that peer 
pressure contributes positively to the children’s obesity-related health outcomes. 
Children who reported facing peer pressure on their self-esteem tend to have higher BMI 
compared to those who did not report it and the impact is statistically significant.50 The 
possible endogeneity associated with peer pressure should be explored in future research. 
Control Variables: The signs, magnitudes, and significance are fairly consistent 
across the estimators. Statistically significant results are discussed here. The children in 
the older age group (of age 13 to 15) exhibit higher BMI than the younger children (of 
age 9 to 11). Those children who participated in active exercise for 30 minutes at least 
one day in the past 14 days tend to have higher BMI compared to those who had no 
active exercise at all in the past 14 days. It may be that those exercise effects are out-
weighted by the energy intake effects.51 Mothers’ BMI has a positive relationship with 
their children’s BMI. For each unit increase in mothers’ BMI, there will be a 0.01 log 
unit increase in their children’s BMI, or about 1 unit BMI score increase. 
 
6.1.2. Children of age 9 to 11 vs. children of age 13 to 15 
Table 5 also exhibits detailed parameter estimation results and standard errors for 
these two subsamples. The IT3SLS estimators have much less significant results 
compared to the ITSUR estimators. Also, in contrast to the pooled model, the two 
estimators now exhibit signs changes. 
                                                 
50 The peer pressure is self-stated data. 
51 Children who exercise more may tend to eat more afterwards. 
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Economic Variables: The IT3SLS estimators show no significant effects among the 
economic variables. The sign changes for only one statistically significant variable 
across the estimators: the marginal effect of the fathers’ food preparation time changes 
from positive in the pooled model ITSUR estimates to negative in the younger children 
model ITSUR estimates. Only statistically significant results are discussed here. 
When considering the analysis of the two age groups separately, the total 
household monthly food expenditure amount only has significantly positive impact on 
the younger children’s BMI outcomes. The magnitude is a little greater than the 
marginal effect in the pooled model, however, the difference is very small. The 
children’s BMI scores increase about 0.2 log units (about a 1.6 unit BMI score increase) 
with every $1,000 increases in food expenditure. There is only one time allocation effect 
that appears to be significant in the children of age 9 to 11 subsample while two more 
marginal effects show up in the older children group. Fathers’ and mothers’ food 
preparation time allocations do not have significant impact on the younger children’s 
BMI while they do contribute to the older children’s BMI outcomes. The BMI of 
children of age 13 to 15 will decrease 0.2 log units for every 100 minutes of additional 
food preparation time fathers devote while the additional 100 minutes mothers allocate 
to food preparation will bring a 0.1 log unit increase in their children’s BMI. Mothers’ 
time spent with their children has consistent negative marginal effect on their children’s 
BMI outcomes across both age groups. The additional 100 minutes mothers devote to 
their children will bring about a 1 unit BMI decrease in their children’s BMI scores 
when their children are young; the marginal effect increases to a 1.3 unit decrease in 
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their children’s BMI scores per 100 minutes increase when their children are older. The 
marginal effect of fathers’ time spent with their children changes from a negative impact 
to a positive impact when their children are of age 13 to 15. However, this marginal 
effect is not significant in both age groups. 
Sociological Variables: Fathers’ work-to-home spillover factor does not have a 
significant marginal effect on the children’s BMI outcomes in either age group and 
across the estimators. A one-unit increase in mothers’ work-to-home spillover brings 
about a 0.09 log unit increase in their children’s BMI. Peer pressure plays a consistent 
positive role in both age groups with the impact slightly higher in the older group. 
Control Variables: There are some sign changes across the estimators, however, 
they all occur in insignificant variables. Boys tend to have higher BMI than girls when 
they are of age 9 to 11. Older children participating in active exercise for 3 to 5 days in 
the past 14 days exhibit higher BMI than those who participated in none. Mothers’ BMI 
plays a consistent positive role in their children’s BMI outcomes with the magnitude of 
the marginal effect decreasing a little for the older group. 
 
6.1.3. Summary for the health production function results 
There exist discrepancies across the two estimators (IT3SLS and ITSUR) 
especially in terms of the numbers of the significant variables. The main concern for the 
IT3SLS estimation is whether the instruments we have satisfy the exogeneity condition 
and the relevance condition. In order to satisfy the relevance condition, the model not 
only needs to have as many instruments as the regressors but also needs to have 
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instruments that are highly correlated with the endogenous variables. If the instruments 
are weak, the finite sample properties of the IV estimators will not be preferred over the 
OLS estimators (Park and Davis). In our empirical analysis, the auxiliary R2 from 
regressing the endogenous variables on the given instruments range from 0.28 to 0.41 for 
the pooled model, from 0.48 to 0.67 for the younger children model, and from 0.38 to 
0.71 for the older children model. However, the auxiliary R2 may be misleading in 
multivariate models. Future studies should utilize more sophisticated tests to evaluate 
and select the instruments. 
Among the significant marginal effects, mother-related variables show more 
influence on the children’s BMI outcomes compared to father-related variables. For both 
age groups, mothers’ time spent with their children has negative marginal effects on 
their children’s BMI at the 5% significance level. Fathers’ time spent with their children 
only has significant negative effect for the pooled model. Among the work-to-home 
spillover factors that capture the home environment, only the mothers’ spillover factor 
positively influences the children’s BMI in a statistically significant way in both the 
pooled model and the younger children model. Meanwhile, the fathers’ BMI does not 
play any significant role and the mothers’ BMI consistently shows a positive influence in 
the children’s BMI outcomes in all three models. 
When children are of age 13 to 15, the fathers’ food preparation time devotion has 
opposite marginal effect compared to the mothers’, i.e., the fathers’ food preparation 
time is negatively related to the children’s BMI while the mothers’ food preparation time 
is positively related to the children’s BMI. The monthly household food expenditure 
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amount contributes positively to the children’s BMI in the pooled model and the younger 
children model. The peer pressure variable consistently plays a significant positive role 
in all three models. 
Another issue that needs to be explored in future work is the dependent variable of 
this obesity-related health production function being captured by the child’s BMI score. 
This dependent variable is a ratio of the child’s weight over height squared. As Farris, 
Perry, and Ailawadi point out, it is recommended that one model the components of the 
ratio instead of only modeling the ratio itself. For example, if parental time spent with 
the child brings positive impacts both to the child’s weight and the child’s height, and if 
the denominator marginal effect equals the numerator marginal effect, then the total ratio 
effect on the BMI score appears to be zero. It is incorrect to conclude that parental time 
spent with the child has no effect on the BMI ratio, rather it is just that the effects offset. 
So the implication in our analysis is to model the child’s weight and height squared 
separately with the same right hand side variables entering the BMI production function 
in order to capture different marginal effects on the BMI components. 
 
6.2. Reduced Form Health Input Demand Functions Estimation Results 
In the general triangular system we developed previously, there are five reduced 
form demand functions for health inputs: total household monthly food expenditure, 
parental food preparation time, and parental time spent with the child. These demand 
functions are final reduced form equations derived from the theoretical framework and 
have no endogenous variables in the right hand side of the equations. Theoretically, this 
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means that the IT3SLS and ITSUR will yield similar estimation results, so in this section 
we will present only the ITSUR estimators.52  
Final reduced form equations derived from the same theoretical framework have 
the same explanatory variables, so these five demand equations all have the same right 
hand side exogenous variables. Table 6, 7 and 8 report the five equation estimation 
results for the pooled model, the younger children model, and the older children model, 
respectively. This section focuses on discussing the statistically significant marginal 
effects. 
 
6.2.1. The pooled model 
Table 6 presents detailed estimation results and standard errors for the pooled 
model five health input demand functions. 
Economic Variables: Both parents’ individual total incomes have a positive 
relationship with the total household monthly food expenditure. Every additional $1,000 
increase in the fathers’ total income brings about a $1.70 increase in the total household 
monthly food expenditure, while each additional $1,000 in the mothers’ total income 
brings about a $1.78 monthly household food expenditure increases.  
Mothers’ individual total income has opposite effects on the fathers’ food 
preparation time and the mothers’ food preparation time: the fathers’ food preparation 
time will increase by 0.2 minutes for every $1,000 increase in the mothers’ income while 
the mothers’ food preparation time will decrease by 0.4 minutes. This may reflect the 
                                                 
52 The IT3SLS and ITSUR are the same in terms of signs and significance and the magnitudes only differ 
by a very small amounts. 
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complementary effect of the household members’ time and money resources, i.e., the 
more time fathers can spend in household related activities, the more time mothers can 
spend in market work. One puzzling result is that working mothers spend more time with 
their children during their working days. 
Sociological Variables: Every one-unit increase in the fathers’ work-to-home 
spillover will bring $65 more household monthly food expenditure and result in mothers 
spending an additional 21 minutes with their children. The more flexible the fathers’ 
work hour schedule is, the more food preparation time fathers will allocate; the more 
flexible the fathers’ work day schedule is, the more monthly household food 
expenditures will be. There is no significant effect from mothers’ spillover and work 
flexibility variables. Fathers’ degree of job commitment is negatively related to the 
household monthly food expenditure, while mothers’ degree of job commitment 
contributes positively to the household monthly food expenditure. Also, it is somewhat 
puzzling that the more committed mothers are to work, the more food preparation time 
the mothers will allocate resulting in fathers spending less time with their children. 
Control Variables: There are only a few significant variables among the control 
variables. Some of the parental decision power variables show up. The more power the 
fathers have in deciding on how much to spend on groceries, the more the household 
monthly food expenditure will be. The more decision power fathers have about whether 
to eat out or not, the more time mothers will spend with their children; however, if 
fathers have more decision power in how much to spend while eating out, mothers will 
spend less time with their children. 
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6.2.2. Children of age 9 to 11 vs. children of age 13 to 15 
Table 7 and Table 8 exhibit detailed parameter estimates and standard errors for 
the younger children model and the older children model, respectively. 
Economic Variables: For the total household monthly food expenditure, the 
individual parent’s total income impact changes along with the children’s age. For the 
younger children model, each additional $1,000 of mothers’ income will increase the 
total household monthly food expenditure by around $3.3. Fathers’ income becomes 
important to food expenditures when the children grow older: every $1,000 increase will 
result in $2.8 more household food expenditure per month. For mothers’ with children in 
the older group, their total available non-working time will contribute positively to the 
total household food expenditure. 
In the younger children sample (Table 7), mothers’ income does not have an effect 
on either fathers’ or mothers’ food preparation time allocation. Only an increase in 
fathers’ total income will result in less time spent by fathers’ in food preparation. For the 
older children sample (Table 8), every $1,000 increase in mothers’ total income will 
result in fathers spending 0.2 minutes more in preparing food, while mothers spend 0.6 
minutes less in food preparation. 
Regarding parental time spent with the child, the total incomes for the individual 
parent do not have a significant impact when the children are young. For the older 
children group, the mothers will spend 0.7 minutes less with their children for every 
$1,000 increase in their total income. When the children are young, parental total 
available non-working time plays more of a role. Mothers will spend an additional 0.3 
  
108
minutes with their children for every one-minute increase in the fathers’ total available 
non-working time. Every additional minute of non-working time mothers have will 
result in fathers spending 0.2 minutes less time with their children and mothers spending 
0.3 minutes more with their children. For the older children, fathers’ total available non-
working time contributes negatively to the mothers’ time with the children. This also 
reflects the intra-household time resource substitution effect: the more time fathers have 
for household-related activities, the more likely mothers are to allocate their time less to 
household-related activities. For fathers with older children, fathers spend significantly 
less time with their children during their working days. 
Sociological Variables: There are few significant sociological variables. The more 
flexible the fathers work day schedule is, the more monthly household food expenditures 
for the older children sample. In the young children sample, mothers’ degree of work 
commitment is negatively related to fathers’ food preparation time allocation; while for 
the older children sample, mothers work commitment contributes positively to their own 
food preparation time devotion. In addition, for the older children sample, the more 
flexible the father’s work hour schedule is and the more committed to work the father is, 
the less time the mother will allocate to food preparation.  
Mothers’ workday flexibility is positively related to fathers’ time with their 
children for both age groups. Fathers’ work hour flexibility is negatively related to 
mothers’ time with their children for the older children sample. 
Control Variables: Households in the younger children age group with children 
who are experiencing peer pressure will have less household food expenditure and less 
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mothers’ time allocated to the children compared to households with children who are 
not experiencing peer pressure. The households with boys of age 13 to 15 spend less 
money on food per month than those households with girls in the same age range. 
Fathers allocate more time to food preparation and spend more time with their children if 
their children are young and participate in active exercise for at least 1 to 2 days in the 
past 14 days. 
Fathers’ decision power in whether to buy groceries or not has a negative 
relationship with mothers’ time with the children in the younger children model and a 
negative impact on household food expenditure in the older children model. Fathers’ 
decision power in whether to eat out or not has a negative relationship with household 
food expenditures for the younger children sample, and has a negative relationship with 
fathers’ time spent with their children for the older children sample. For the older 
children sample, if fathers have more say so in the grocery expenditure amount, the 
household expenditure on food will increase and fathers’ time spent with their children 
will increase also. 
 
6.2.3. Summary for the health input demand functions results 
Fathers’ or mothers’ own individual income appears to have a negative effect on 
their own food preparation time allocation. For the older age group, as mothers’ own 
income increases their time with their children tends to decrease. This is consistent with 
the income and non-working time substitution relationship for a person’s own resource 
allocation.  
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The results of the pooled model and the older children model indicate that fathers’ 
non-market work time and mothers’ total income are complements showing the time and 
money complementary relationship between parents. Stated in another way, fathers’ 
non-market work time and mothers’ non-market work time display a substitution 
relationship. 
Parental total available non-working time is positively related to the two parental 
time allocation choices, especially for the young children sample. An increase in 
mothers’ total available time will induce more mothers’ time with their children and less 
fathers’ time with their children. This, again, shows the substitution effect between 
parents’ time resources. 
 
6.3. Parental Time Marginal Effects 
In the empirical results, fathers’ and mothers’ time spent with their children have 
negative impacts on their children’s BMI outcomes, in general. In other words, parental 
time spent with their children will bring a positive impact to their children’s health 
outcomes: 0
*
≥∂
∂
i
CT
H .53 The fathers’ time with their children is a positive contributor to 
the children’s BMI in the older age group, however it is not significant at the 10% 
significance level. The children’s BMI is negatively influenced by mothers’ time spent 
with them for both age groups when they are analyzed separately. In the pooled model 
the children’s BMI will be negatively influenced only by the fathers’ time spent with 
                                                 
53 The higher the BMI is, the worse the child’s health will be. So we can also us the (-BMI) to represent 
the health outcomes, H. 
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them. The signs are robust across estimators, however, the magnitudes and significances 
are not. 
As the theory shows, we cannot sign the parental time marginal effects on the 
children’s health outcomes without further assumptions. The comparative statics results 
derived in the theoretical chapter give us inequality (3.29): 
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Different quantity and quality of parental time devoted to the children will bring 
different marginal effects (they may be different in signs and magnitudes). The theory 
only allows the above combination effect to be signed because the parental time spent 
with the child variables enter more than on first order condition.54 The left hand side of 
inequality (3.29) is composed of three different marginal utility impacts of parental time 
spent with the child: 
1. Part (a): Health effect; 
2. Part (b): Exercise (energy expenditure) process benefit/bad effect; 
3. Part (c): Food consumption (energy intake) process benefit/bad effect. 
In order to disentangle the health effect, we need to make enough assumptions on cross 
effects and magnitudes to be able to sign the combination of part (b) and part (c).55 
We expect different marginal health impacts from mothers’ time and fathers’ time 
and use the home environment indicator in our model to try to capture parental time 
quality. 
                                                 
54 Detailed discussion can be found in Chapter III. 
55 The details can be found in section 3.4 of Chapter III. 
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The parental time partial effect is decomposed as shown in Equation (3.28) in the 
theoretical chapter: 
(3.28) 
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Part (a) is the energy intake impact from parental time with the children and part (b) is 
the energy output impact.56 As the energy balance equation shows, when the energy 
intake effect (part (a)) outweighs the energy output effect (part (b)), there will be energy 
stored inside the person’s body which will contribute to overweight and obesity. 
Different quality and quantity of parental time spent with children will bring different 
total marginal effects to children’s obesity-related health outcomes. Specific 
assumptions on the properties of the cross marginal effects on the child’s utility level 
will enable us to derive specific signs as discussed in the theoretical chapter. 
 
6.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter reports detailed empirical estimation results from the triangular 
system. The empirical analysis shows that a complementary relationship exists between 
mothers’ total income and fathers’ non-market work time. The mothers’ and fathers’ 
individual total income and individual non-market work time allocation choices display 
the expected substitution effects. Meanwhile mothers’ income and fathers’ non-work 
time allocation choices display a complementary effect. Mothers’ time spent with their 
children is negatively related to their children’s BMI scores, which means that mothers’ 
                                                 
56 As discussed in the theoretical chapter (Chapter III), we assume that the energy output is mainly 
represented by the exercising time. 
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time spent with their children will improve their children’s obesity-related health 
outcomes. Mothers’ work-to-home spillover also plays an important positive role in the 
BMI production. This is a factor we used to capture the quality of time meaning that it is 
not just the quantity of time that matters but the quality of time is also important. 
The results are not robust across the two alternative estimators (IT3SLS and 
ITSUR) which may indicate the instruments are possibly weak. Future research should 
consider the theoretically supported instruments, tests of these instruments, selecting the 
functional forms and selecting and defining some of the variables (such as work 
flexibility and work commitment variables).  
Another issue that can be examined in future work is to model the numerator and 
the denominator of the BMI ratio separately to explore potential differences in marginal 
effects on the two components. 
Also, the sample size of this study is relatively small and presents a problem in 
normality tests. Future work can apply the Anderson-Darling test (recommended for the 
small samples), normal quantile-quantile plot, and the kernel density plot to test for the 
normality assumption of the regressions to assess the reliability of the statistical 
significance. If the normality assumption can not be satisfied, non-parametric methods 
can be a future study direction. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter will summarize the theory and empirical results of this study and 
discuss future work. 
 
7.1. Conclusion 
Overweight and obesity have become a global epidemic. The increased prevalence 
of childhood obesity is especially a major concern for society. This study explores the 
influence of parental time allocation choices on children’s obesity-related health 
outcomes and examines the potential differences between fathers’ time marginal effect 
and mothers’ time marginal effect. 
The theoretical chapter lays out the theoretical foundation for the analysis. A 
household with two parents and one child is modeled. Household production theory and 
the collective household modeling structure are combined in order to capture the 
dynamics taking place in this multi-person household. Because the focus of our study is 
the impact of parental choices on the child’s obesity-related health outcomes, we only 
model the child’s obesity-related health production. The nutrition literature helps to 
define two household production functions (the obesity-related health production 
function and the nutrient intake production function) which generate a nested health 
production constraint for the model. 
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The model treats the mother, the father and the child as three separate agents with 
individual preferences. The two parents’ interaction is modeled within the collective 
model framework by assuming that the two parents will reach Pareto efficient resource 
allocation between them. In order to capture the dynamics within the household 
decision-making between parents and the child, the theoretical framework models the 
parents-child interaction as a two-stage Stackleberg game structure where the child is 
allowed to have certain decision choices of his/her own. The parents act as the leader by 
setting up the family rules and making parental decisions first while taking into account 
the child’s possible responses to their decisions. The child is the follower who makes 
his/her own decisions after observing the parental choices made in the first stage. This 
game structure allows us to explore the parental influence on the child’s health outcome 
while allowing the child to have some influencing power in the household decision 
making process. 
Based on the theoretical model, an empirical model is derived and presented in the 
empirical setup chapter. The theoretical model serves to specify the empirical model and 
the data in a theoretically consistent way. 
From the theoretical model derivation, two specifications are derived for the 
child’s obesity-related health production function. One of which, with parental decision 
variables as its arguments, is selected as our empirical specification. This specification 
preserves the parental decision variables in the child’s obesity-related health production 
function and enables us to explore parental marginal effects. The specific stage of the 
theoretical game structure also provides us with several reduced form health input 
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demand functions. The child’s health production function is combined with the reduced-
form health input demand functions (the parental choice equations) to construct an 
empirical system, in order to gain both consistency and efficiency. 
This constructed empirical system is modified to accommodate the data limitations. 
However, this modification does not distract us from the focus of this study. The partial 
effects of parental time allocation on the child’s obesity-related health outcome can still 
be explored. 
The identification issue is examined. The empirical system is a general triangular 
system with cross-equation correlations considered. The IT3SLS is the chosen 
estimation procedure for consistent and efficient results. In case of weak instruments, 
both ITSUR and IT3SLS results are presented to access the robustness across these 
estimators. 
The data and summary statistics chapter provides detailed descriptions of data set 
collection. The sampling process and survey instruments are reported as well.  
The data set used in this study covers several aspects of household dynamics, 
including financial information, parenting styles, sociological factors, family meal 
practice, nutrient intake pattern, parental time allocation information and children’s time 
allocation information as well as socio-demographics. This complex data covers 
individual household members and provides us with individual-level parental 
information and the child health outcome data. The richness of the data set makes it 
possible to explore parental decision influences and the potential differences between 
fathers and mothers.  
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Variable generation and descriptions of the sixteen variables of interest are 
discussed. The household monthly food expenditure amount is generated by using the 
decision-maker’s reported amount. Individual parental income is the sum of wage 
income and non-wage income. The parental time allocation variables are generated in a 
specific way in order to capture working-day time devotion pattern if time diary data 
reflects information for at least one working day; otherwise the time allocation variables 
will depict a non-working day pattern. The children’s BMI and the parents’ individual 
BMI are calculated according to the BMI definition. The parent’s work-to-home 
spillover is one factor generated using factor analysis. The work environmental variables 
are all ranking variables which reflect ordinal changes. The other exogenous variables 
such as peer pressure, socio-demographics, activity level, and parents’ decision power 
variables are discussed as well. 
The empirical estimation is performed for three systems: pooled model (pooled 
over the two age groups with an age dummy added), younger children model (of age 9 to 
11), and older children model (of age 13 to 15). Among the results for the children’s 
obesity-related health production function, discrepancies exist across the two estimators 
(IT3SLS and ITSUR), especially in terms of the numbers of the significant variables.  
The mother-related variables have more influence on the children’s BMI outcomes 
as compared to the father-related variables. For both age groups, mothers’ time spent 
with their children has a negative marginal effect on their children’s BMI at the 5% 
significance level. Fathers’ time spent with their children has significant negative effect 
only in the pooled model. Among the work-to-home spillover factors that capture home 
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environment, only mothers’ spillover factor positively influences the children’s BMI in a 
statistically significant way. The work-to-home spillover factor is used to capture the 
quality of time which is as important as quantity. Fathers’ BMI does not play any 
significant role while mothers’ BMI consistently has a positive influencing factor in the 
children’s BMI outcomes. 
Fathers’ or mothers’ individual income appears to have a negative effect on 
fathers’ or mothers’ own food preparation time allocation. In the older children group, 
the mothers’ own income increases tend to decrease mothers’ time with their children. 
This is consistent with the income and non-working time substitution relationship. The 
results of the pooled model and the older children model show that fathers’ non-market 
work time and mothers’ total income are complementary. There is a complementary 
relationship between the parents’ time and money. 
The main contribution of this study is that it develops a general theoretical 
framework to capture the dynamics between the parents and the child. It takes the 
parents-child interaction out of the black box. Based on this theoretical model, empirical 
analysis and future research can be conducted in a theoretically consistent way. 
 
7.2. Future Work 
This study laid out a general theoretical framework for exploring parental 
influences on children’s obesity-related health outcomes. The empirical work is just a 
starting point and leaves a lot of room for future research. 
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7.2.1. Model specification issues 
The empirical results indicate that there are several variables that are not 
significant. One consideration for future examination can be exploring ways to simplify 
the model even further. Meanwhile, equation (3.28): 
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shows that there are two components in parental time partial effects on children’s health 
outcomes. Estimating the nutrient intake function and the reduced-form child’s exercise 
time allocation function can be an alternative way to explore the total health effects. This 
involves utilizing the children’s time diary data collected in the project. 
The empirical functional forms selection will be another future work direction. 
Also measurement errors associated with some variables may exist. For example, the 
model has home environment, work environment and peer pressure indicators and these 
sociological variables defining issues can be explored further. Also parental time spent 
with the child variable could be generated in a more specific way to separate the quantity 
of time and the quality of time. 
Another future work consideration is the BMI score. This score is a ratio and can 
be broken down into two components: weight and height squared. Modeling those two 
components individually to allow for potentially different marginal effects is another 
area to explore.  
 
 
  
120
7.2.2. Estimator issues 
In the empirical analysis heteroskedasticity tests should be performed to determine 
whether the general method of moments (GMM) method should be employed or not. 
The empirical results show discrepancies across the ITSUR and IT3SLS estimators 
which may indicate that the instruments we have are weak. The auxiliary R-squares do 
not show that the instruments are weak, however, the reliability of this test is limited. 
More sophisticated tests should be performed to test the instruments.  Non-parametric 
methods can be employed also. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Variable Description 
Variable Description Unit 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp  Household total food expenditure Dollars 
FatherPrepTime  Father's time spent in food preparation Minutes 
MotherPrepTime  Mother's time spent in food preparation Minutes 
FatherChildTime  Father's time spent with the child Minutes 
MotherChildTime Mother's time spent with the child Minutes 
KidBMI  The child's Body Mass Index Kilograms/meters2 
   
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome Father's total income (earned + unearned) Dollars 
MotherIncome Mother's total income (earned + unearned) Dollars 
FatherTime Father's total non-work time Minutes 
MotherTime Mother's total non-work time Minutes 
FatherWorkDay Father's working day indicator: 1 if it is the working-day pattern; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
MotherWorkDay Mother's working day indicator: 1 if it is the working-day pattern; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
   
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover Father's work to home spillover Factor 
MotherSpillover Mother's work to home spillover Factor 
Peer Indicator for peer pressure – 1 if there exists peer pressure; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
FatherHR Father's work hour flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible Rank 
MotherHR Mother's work hour flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible Rank 
FatherDay Father's work day flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible Rank 
MotherDay Mother's work day flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible Rank 
FatherCommit Father's commitment to work – 1 to 5 means work is very low priority in life to very high 
priority in life 
Rank 
MotherCommit Mother's commitment to work – 1 to 5 means work is very low priority in life to very high 
priority in life 
Rank 
   
Control Variables 
Age* Child's age group indicator – 1 if the child is of age 13-15; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
Gender Child's gender – 1 is for male; 0 is for female 0 or 1 
White Child's ethnicity – 1 is for white; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
Hispanic Child's ethnicity – 1 is for Hispanic; 0 otherwise 0 or 1 
Puberty Child ’s Puberty Stage – 1 if pubescent; 0 for pre-pubescent 0 or 1 
Activity1 Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 1 to 2 days; 0 if not 0 or 1 
Activity2 Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 3 to 5 days; 0 if not 0 or 1 
Activity3 Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 6 to 8 days; 0 if not 0 or 1 
Activity4 Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 9 or more days; 0 if not 0 or 1 
FatherBMI Father's Body Mass Index Kilograms/meters2 
MotherBMI Mother's Body Mass Index Kilograms/meters2 
D1 Father and mother decision power difference in "whether to buy groceries" Categories 
D2 Father and mother decision power difference in "whether to eat out" Categories 
D3 Father and mother decision power difference in "how much to spend on groceries" Categories 
D4 Father and mother decision power difference in "how much to spend on eating out" Categories 
 
* The “Age” variable only enters the pooled model (the two age groups are pooled together). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Pooled Model 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp  127 687.85 234.69 210.00 1579.00 
FatherPrepTime  127 20.73 25.14 0 114.50 
MotherPrepTime  127 64.98 53.90 0 314.50 
FatherChildTime  127 78.43 112.10 0 967.00 
MotherChildTime 127 90.78 91.51 0 479.50 
KidBMI  127 20.72 4.67 14.35 45.10 
      
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome 127 77696.95 52472.76 1200.00 370000.00 
MotherIncome 127 32461.22 33918.37 1125.00 212750.00 
FatherTime 127 1001.75 204.65 547.50 1440.00 
MotherTime 127 1132.92 214.40 690.00 1440.00 
FatherWorkDay 127 0.90 0.30 0 1.00 
MotherWorkDay 127 0.80 0.40 0 1.00 
      
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover 127 -0.05 0.89 -1.85 2.63 
MotherSpillover 127 0.08 0.76 -1.36 2.34 
Peer 127 0.10 0.30 0 1.00 
FatherHR 127 2.24 0.68 1.00 3.00 
MotherHR 127 2.06 0.82 1.00 3.00 
FatherDay 127 1.78 0.82 1.00 3.00 
MotherDay 127 1.75 0.83 1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit 127 2.44 1.04 1.00 5.00 
MotherCommit 127 1.91 0.80 1.00 4.00 
      
Control Variables 
Age* 127 0.55 0.50 0 1.00 
Gender 127 0.48 0.50 0 1.00 
White 127 0.80 0.41 0 1.00 
Hispanic 127 0.11 0.31 0 1.00 
Puberty 127 0.88 0.32 0 1.00 
Activity1 127 0.18 0.39 0 1.00 
Activity2 127 0.25 0.44 0 1.00 
Activity3 127 0.26 0.44 0 1.00 
Activity4 127 0.26 0.44 0 1.00 
FatherBMI 127 27.41 3.73 17.63 36.28 
MotherBMI 127 25.25 5.16 18.09 46.20 
D1 127 0.23 0.83 -2.00 2.00 
D2 127 0.10 0.64 -2.00 2.00 
D3 127 0.24 0.83 -2.00 2.00 
D4 127 0.06 0.76 -2.00 2.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Children Ages 9 to 11 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp  57 676.04 236.25 210.00 1579.00 
FatherPrepTime  57 16.06 20.77 0 80.00 
MotherPrepTime  57 64.30 43.34 0 202.50 
FatherChildTime  57 82.86 78.66 0 419.00 
MotherChildTime 57 113.07 95.89 0 479.50 
KidBMI  57 19.05 3.75 14.35 28.71 
      
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome 57 79436.58 57665.00 13356.00 370000.00 
MotherIncome 57 29795.18 33296.91 1125.00 160000.00 
FatherTime 57 1003.68 218.64 547.50 1440.00 
MotherTime 57 1159.52 211.39 825.00 1440.00 
FatherWorkDay 57 0.89 0.31 0 1.00 
MotherWorkDay 57 0.81 0.40 0 1.00 
      
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover 57 -0.06 0.99 -1.66 2.63 
MotherSpillover 57 0.07 0.74 -1.36 1.86 
Peer 57 0.11 0.31 0 1.00 
FatherHR 57 2.25 0.74 1.00 3.00 
MotherHR 57 2.14 0.77 1.00 3.00 
FatherDay 57 1.93 0.88 1.00 3.00 
MotherDay 57 1.77 0.82 1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit 57 2.53 1.04 1.00 5.00 
MotherCommit 57 1.88 0.78 1.00 4.00 
      
Control Variables 
Gender 57 0.42 0.50 0 1.00 
White 57 0.74 0.44 0 1.00 
Hispanic 57 0.18 0.38 0 1.00 
Puberty 57 0.75 0.43 0 1.00 
Activity1 57 0.16 0.37 0 1.00 
Activity2 57 0.30 0.46 0 1.00 
Activity3 57 0.32 0.47 0 1.00 
Activity4 57 0.18 0.38 0 1.00 
FatherBMI 57 27.23 3.64 20.08 35.95 
MotherBMI 57 24.77 4.50 18.09 41.20 
D1 57 0.18 0.76 -2.00 2.00 
D2 57 0.12 0.66 -2.00 1.00 
D3 57 0.21 0.90 -2.00 2.00 
D4 57 0.04 0.63 -1.00 1.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Children Ages 13 to 15 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp  70 697.47 234.68 250.00 1460.00 
FatherPrepTime  70 24.54 27.78 0 114.50 
MotherPrepTime  70 65.54 61.48 0 314.50 
FatherChildTime  70 74.83 133.77 0 967.00 
MotherChildTime 70 72.63 84.17 0 442.50 
KidBMI  70 22.08 4.92 14.80 45.10 
      
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome 70 76280.40 48214.52 1200.00 283044.00 
MotherIncome 70 34632.14 34501.85 2400.00 212750.00 
FatherTime 70 1000.19 194.10 607.50 1440.00 
MotherTime 70 1111.26 215.91 690.00 1440.00 
FatherWorkDay 70 0.90 0.30 0 1.00 
MotherWorkDay 70 0.80 0.40 0 1.00 
      
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover 70 -0.05 0.80 -1.85 2.19 
MotherSpillover 70 0.09 0.79 -1.31 2.34 
Peer 70 0.10 0.30 0 1.00 
FatherHR 70 2.24 0.62 1.00 3.00 
MotherHR 70 1.99 0.86 1.00 3.00 
FatherDay 70 1.66 0.74 1.00 3.00 
MotherDay 70 1.73 0.83 1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit 70 2.37 1.04 1.00 5.00 
MotherCommit 70 1.93 0.82 1.00 4.00 
      
Control Variables 
Gender 70 0.53 0.50 0 1.00 
White 70 0.84 0.37 0 1.00 
Hispanic 70 0.06 0.23 0 1.00 
Puberty 70 0.99 0.12 0 1.00 
Activity1 70 0.20 0.40 0 1.00 
Activity2 70 0.21 0.41 0 1.00 
Activity3 70 0.21 0.41 0 1.00 
Activity4 70 0.33 0.47 0 1.00 
FatherBMI 70 27.56 3.82 17.63 36.28 
MotherBMI 70 25.64 5.64 18.88 46.20 
D1 70 0.27 0.88 -2.00 2.00 
D2 70 0.09 0.63 -2.00 2.00 
D3 70 0.27 0.78 -1.00 2.00 
D4 70 0.09 0.86 -2.00 2.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 5. The Obesity-Related Health Production Function Results 
  Pooled Model Age 9 to 11 Age 13 to 15 
Variables  IT3SLS ITSUR IT3SLS ITSUR IT3SLS ITSUR 
Intercept 2.12* 2.09* 1.90* 1.95* 2.38* 2.54* 
 (0.32) (0.22) (0.44) (0.30) (0.41) (0.40) 
TotExp 1.51E-04 1.39E-04* 3.43E-04 2.04E-04* -6.45E-06 2.40E-05 
 (1.56E-04) (6.70E-05) (3.03E-04) (9.20E-05) (1.86E-04) (1.13E-04) 
FatherPrepTime 1.77E-03 2.96E-03* 1.25E-03 -6.90E-04 8.21E-04 -1.90E-03* 
 (2.90E-03) (5.91E-04) (4.62E-03) (1.09E-03) (2.78E-03) (7.50E-04) 
MotherPrepTime 3.51E-04 5.82E-04* 1.83E-03 9.39E-04 1.07E-03 1.02E-03* 
 (8.21E-04) (2.87E-04) (2.05E-03) (5.79E-04) (7.45E-04) (3.56E-04) 
FatherChildTime -4.90E-04 -7.00E-04* -7.20E-04 -4.30E-04 4.00E-05 1.28E-04 
 (5.15E-04) (1.29E-04) (9.17E-04) (2.65E-04) (3.41E-04) (1.63E-04) 
MotherChildTime -1.00E-04 -6.00E-05 -1.12E-03 -6.50E-04* -4.40E-04 -1.13E-03* 
 (7.46E-04) (1.75E-04) (9.91E-04) (2.52E-04) (7.45E-04) (2.63E-04) 
FatherSpillover -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -3.07E-03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
MotherSpillover 0.05** 0.05** 0.12 0.09* 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Peer 0.24* 0.26* 0.24 0.20* 0.30* 0.29* 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Gender 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.12** -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
White -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 6.25E-03 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Hispanic -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) 
Age 0.09** 0.08** - - - - 
 (0.05) (0.04) - - - - 
Puberty 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.16 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.24) (0.27) 
Activity1 0.21* 0.22* 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) 
Activity2 0.22* 0.23* 0.04 0.10 0.34* 0.27** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.20) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
Activity3 0.23* 0.24* 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.12 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) 
Activity4 0.21* 0.24* 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.09 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) 
FatherBMI 7.24E-03 7.41E-03 7.99E-03 8.15E-03 2.47E-03 1.39E-03 
 (6.03E-03) (5.54E-03) (0.01) (8.08E-03) (7.06E-03) (8.00E-03) 
MotherBMI 0.01* 0.01* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01* 9.60E-03** 
 (4.12E-03) (4.08E-03) (8.92E-03) (6.61E-03) (5.44E-03) (5.54E-03) 
D1 -0.03 -0.03 -1.93E-03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
D2 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -1.54E-03 -8.60E-04 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
D3 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 6.63E-03 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
D4 6.53E-03 3.64E-04 -0.06 -0.02 -2.70E-03 4.69E-03 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.
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Table 6. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Pooled Model 
Variables  TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Intercept 325.98 11.67 138.88 59.42 111.23 
 (369.33) (43.46) (89.41) (183.79) (158.79) 
FatherIncome 1.70E-03* -8.00E-05 5.40E-05 3.60E-05 -9.00E-05 
 (4.20E-04) (4.90E-05) (1.03E-04) (2.01E-04) (1.83E-04) 
MotherIncome 1.78E-03* 1.93E-04* -3.80E-04* 1.13E-04 -4.60E-04 
 (6.55E-04) (7.70E-05) (1.60E-04) (3.14E-04) (2.84E-04) 
FatherSpillover 65.07* 0.60 5.22 -2.25 21.06* 
 (24.73) (2.95) (5.86) (13.41) (10.38) 
MotherSpillover -5.71 -0.29 -5.87 -14.45 5.56 
 (28.80) (3.43) (6.81) (15.68) (12.07) 
FatherHR -36.83 6.44** -12.32 -12.06 -10.93 
 (33.34) (3.90) (8.16) (15.76) (14.51) 
FatherDay 73.14* -0.03 10.01 -12.41 3.66 
 (29.95) (3.50) (7.33) (14.14) (13.04) 
MotherHR -21.51 -0.42 -6.39 -11.49 18.76 
 (30.60) (3.58) (7.49) (14.44) (13.32) 
MotherDay 14.79 2.29 3.81 25.20 1.27 
 (33.05) (3.86) (8.09) (15.56) (14.40) 
FatherCommit -40.00** -2.34 -7.02 -2.18 -1.33 
 (20.63) (2.41) (5.05) (9.76) (8.98) 
MotherCommit 42.30** -1.48 13.01* -30.84* 11.19 
 (24.94) (2.92) (6.10) (11.80) (10.85) 
Peer 9.77 -9.94 -18.11 15.94 -3.29 
 (70.67) (8.42) (16.74) (38.26) (29.67) 
Gender -68.25** 1.37 -4.71 19.25 7.58 
 (41.14) (4.91) (9.71) (22.55) (17.20) 
White 10.12 12.36 -20.82 2.39 24.62 
 (72.87) (8.69) (17.26) (39.51) (30.58) 
Hispanic 140.13 13.08 -13.82 27.49 -15.84 
 (89.14) (10.65) (21.04) (48.92) (37.26) 
Age 69.89 4.43 14.02 -9.49 -23.14 
 (44.47) (5.31) (10.51) (24.33) (18.61) 
Puberty -17.26 11.00 -8.54 -17.17 -34.87 
 (68.63) (8.19) (16.21) (37.57) (28.71) 
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Table 6. Continued 
Variables  TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Activity1 -21.44 2.23 -9.07 61.99 -12.38 
 (105.25) (12.56) (24.86) (57.57) (44.04) 
Activity2 -44.51 -2.42 5.85 45.34 -23.26 
 (100.80) (12.04) (23.79) (55.34) (42.13) 
Activity3 36.72 -5.19 0.50 32.18 -0.96 
 (100.36) (11.99) (23.67) (55.21) (41.91) 
Activity4 -60.48 -8.17 -12.03 56.61 -19.25 
 (103.11) (12.31) (24.34) (56.52) (43.11) 
FatherBMI -5.05 -0.34 -0.86 0.41 -3.45 
 (5.73) (0.68) (1.35) (3.13) (2.40) 
MotherBMI -1.71 -0.40 -1.34 0.07 -0.48 
 (4.23) (0.50) (1.00) (2.31) (1.77) 
FatherTime 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 
 (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
MotherTime 0.15 -0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.09 
 (0.14) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
D1 -25.81 2.62 -2.70 -10.78 -9.12 
 (28.61) (3.42) (6.74) (15.81) (11.93) 
D2 -23.18 -4.08 -0.82 -18.86 30.55* 
 (32.95) (3.93) (7.78) (18.06) (13.78) 
D3 88.69* -0.27 1.98 9.11 15.11 
 (30.84) (3.68) (7.28) (16.91) (12.89) 
D4 5.94 3.02 1.15 -4.66 -20.67** 
 (27.89) (3.33) (6.58) (15.31) (11.66) 
FatherWorkDay 102.17 -8.32 -15.47 -60.70 -15.33 
 (95.24) (11.13) (23.32) (44.93) (41.47) 
MotherWorkDay 38.35 -3.83 -15.56 -3.41 53.14** 
  (71.40) (8.34) (17.48) (33.70) (31.09) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.
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Table 7. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Age 9 to 11 Model 
Variables TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Intercept 283.90 0.71 121.89 319.96 -338.42 
 (673.25) (67.19) (114.68) (257.08) (267.30) 
FatherIncome 1.16E-03 -1.60E-04* -6.00E-05 8.10E-05 1.20E-05 
 (7.09E-04) (7.30E-05) (1.25E-04) (2.77E-04) (2.85E-04) 
MotherIncome 3.27E-03* -3.00E-05 -1.50E-04 2.79E-04 -2.70E-04 
 (1.34E-03) (1.38E-04) (2.37E-04) (5.26E-04) (5.39E-04) 
FatherSpillover 4.49 -5.32 -9.40 13.79 23.70 
 (51.62) (5.07) (8.64) (19.46) (20.37) 
MotherSpillover -58.24 6.74 -9.76 41.85 3.55 
 (72.70) (6.95) (11.81) (26.82) (28.39) 
FatherHR 44.30 6.84 -0.23 11.45 -17.43 
 (71.21) (7.45) (12.76) (28.24) (28.81) 
FatherDay 66.89 3.32 -4.60 -15.29 4.39 
 (54.12) (5.66) (9.69) (21.45) (21.89) 
MotherHR 30.39 7.18 -0.11 -26.20 31.27 
 (57.77) (6.00) (10.27) (22.78) (23.30) 
MotherDay -133.32 -7.06 20.80 57.79** -55.46 
 (87.07) (8.96) (15.34) (34.09) (35.00) 
FatherCommit -7.62 0.10 -3.78 -27.50 4.42 
 (51.95) (5.42) (9.29) (20.57) (21.00) 
MotherCommit 60.65 -9.98* 3.28 -29.32 -6.57 
 (47.28) (4.84) (8.28) (18.43) (18.96) 
Peer -282.36** -9.55 -12.84 88.44 -114.21* 
 (145.61) (13.90) (23.63) (53.66) (56.84) 
Gender -17.87 14.62 -3.10 31.71 46.84 
 (96.67) (9.32) (15.87) (35.92) (37.88) 
White -176.26 19.65 19.76 39.35 -41.59 
 (134.35) (12.59) (21.37) (48.81) (52.10) 
Hispanic -118.08 5.21 35.13 48.96 -58.98 
 (159.98) (15.05) (25.55) (58.29) (62.12) 
Puberty -8.74 8.92 -14.70 1.26 -3.89 
 (95.08) (8.97) (15.23) (34.71) (36.95) 
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Table 7. Continued 
Variables TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Activity1 -164.81 33.58* 10.22 115.69** -32.54 
 (176.19) (16.44) (27.88) (63.77) (68.20) 
Activity2 -318.67** 20.74 37.10 52.37 -24.28 
 (166.11) (15.52) (26.33) (60.19) (64.33) 
Activity3 -233.35 10.42 23.24 57.97 -78.91 
 (173.61) (16.32) (27.70) (63.20) (67.38) 
Activity4 -232.59 8.45 6.67 25.01 -39.64 
 (177.70) (16.52) (28.02) (64.15) (68.70) 
FatherBMI -0.75 0.25 -1.58 -0.44 -1.41 
 (11.39) (1.07) (1.81) (4.13) (4.41) 
MotherBMI -4.56 -0.96 1.48 1.11 -3.09 
 (11.04) (1.06) (1.80) (4.08) (4.32) 
FatherTime 0.17 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.31* 
 (0.28) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
MotherTime 0.39 -6.65E-03 0.03 -0.23* 0.25* 
 (0.29) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) 
D1 -20.46 0.49 5.94 5.60 -39.90** 
 (55.33) (5.12) (8.69) (19.91) (21.36) 
D2 -161.24* -4.65 7.36 21.67 -9.51 
 (74.16) (7.18) (12.22) (27.63) (29.10) 
D3 -52.32 -6.93 -3.35 -9.96 -6.33 
 (58.18) (5.47) (9.29) (21.19) (22.59) 
D4 173.11 2.97 8.06 -57.00 76.09** 
 (107.90) (10.64) (18.14) (40.81) (42.64) 
FatherWorkDay 131.38 -5.76 -44.30 -18.15 97.03 
 (151.96) (15.75) (26.97) (59.84) (61.26) 
MotherWorkDay -123.81 -0.50 -25.51 -83.08 50.13 
  (149.57) (15.54) (26.60) (59.00) (60.35) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.
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Table 8. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Age 13 to 15 Model 
Variables TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Intercept 17.36 69.97 248.81 198.08 371.58 
 (614.87) (99.92) (215.67) (472.55) (275.05) 
FatherIncome 2.75E-03* 3.00E-05 1.39E-04 -4.20E-04 7.00E-05 
 (5.73E-04) (9.20E-05) (2.01E-04) (4.41E-04) (2.54E-04) 
MotherIncome 4.35E-04 2.43E-04** -6.10E-04* 1.20E-04 -7.70E-04* 
 (7.89E-04) (1.26E-04) (2.78E-04) (6.10E-04) (3.44E-04) 
FatherSpillover 41.44 -0.77 10.95 -6.94 1.74 
 (35.01) (6.00) (11.99) (26.23) (16.90) 
MotherSpillover -7.81 -3.89 -3.68 -26.93 -17.58 
 (32.78) (5.65) (11.20) (24.50) (15.93) 
FatherHR -63.06 2.66 -28.22** 17.96 -45.94* 
 (43.60) (6.94) (15.42) (33.80) (18.93) 
FatherDay 70.51** -7.76 22.67 2.32 5.92 
 (39.36) (6.25) (13.93) (30.54) (17.01) 
MotherHR 27.97 -0.37 -5.27 -42.47 21.44 
 (36.96) (5.87) (13.09) (28.69) (15.97) 
MotherDay -25.99 6.65 -0.14 60.36** -15.83 
 (42.35) (6.73) (14.99) (32.86) (18.33) 
FatherCommit -22.64 -1.98 -20.31* 7.31 -5.16 
 (24.80) (3.94) (8.77) (19.23) (10.74) 
MotherCommit 29.74 -4.92 23.98* 12.09 -14.39 
 (31.86) (5.06) (11.28) (24.73) (13.77) 
Peer 70.99 -9.09 -35.90 -4.94 36.23 
 (83.37) (14.38) (28.47) (62.30) (40.56) 
Gender -133.39* 1.73 -12.67 34.71 -33.04 
 (47.04) (8.16) (16.02) (35.05) (23.06) 
White -50.51 7.19 -32.65 36.23 37.20 
 (97.99) (16.59) (33.75) (73.90) (46.48) 
Hispanic 92.55 -9.10 -28.80 47.14 -9.99 
 (137.05) (23.40) (47.03) (102.94) (65.74) 
Puberty 113.92 8.99 -25.21 -223.29 -37.13 
 (233.82) (40.14) (80.02) (175.13) (113.05) 
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Table 8. Continued 
Variables TotExp FatherPrepTime MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
      
Activity1 39.12 -25.07 -21.13 0.53 -13.45 
 (153.44) (26.10) (52.75) (115.46) (73.23) 
Activity2 157.06 -23.67 -16.78 -3.93 1.96 
 (135.81) (23.34) (46.45) (101.66) (65.77) 
Activity3 109.28 -28.89 -21.36 -25.45 -1.18 
 (148.33) (25.29) (50.93) (111.48) (71.04) 
Activity4 -2.09 -31.07 -29.74 39.55 -28.77 
 (142.90) (24.38) (49.05) (107.37) (68.48) 
FatherBMI -3.32 0.23 -0.87 -2.23 -1.63 
 (7.38) (1.26) (2.54) (5.55) (3.53) 
MotherBMI -0.75 -0.08 -2.49 -1.80 -2.17 
 (4.86) (0.83) (1.67) (3.65) (2.34) 
FatherTime -0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.19* 
 (0.20) (0.03) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) 
MotherTime 0.31** -0.04 0.09 0.17 0.12 
 (0.18) (0.03) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) 
D1 -56.56** 3.79 2.55 -22.70 3.40 
 (34.08) (5.87) (11.64) (25.48) (16.56) 
D2 26.52 -6.90 -10.66 -55.37** 15.89 
 (42.19) (7.28) (14.40) (31.52) (20.53) 
D3 131.21* 2.26 0.86 60.59* 8.66 
 (39.52) (6.79) (13.52) (29.59) (19.12) 
D4 1.91 9.74** -3.70 -30.46 -22.78 
 (31.25) (5.38) (10.67) (23.36) (15.18) 
FatherWorkDay 71.52 -8.29 11.33 -248.24* -34.78 
 (124.88) (19.89) (44.16) (96.79) (54.25) 
MotherWorkDay 104.60 -23.13 -17.11 118.48 66.85 
  (95.00) (15.15) (33.58) (73.60) (41.33) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
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